Bitbucket Server (ManpreetShuann) MCP Server
bitbucket-server-mcp
PyPI
v1.7.0
Published by manpreetshuann — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Atlassian Bitbucket Server (Enterprise) REST API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: browse_files → list_files → create_pull_request. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow browse_files → list_files → create_pull_request
Tools 66
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_filesingests untrusted inputcreate_pull_requestnetwork egresscreate_pull_request_tasknetwork egresslist_filesreads sensitive dataadd_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilityapprove_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitycan_merge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityconvert_to_draftno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_draft_pull_requestno sensitive capability
Show 56 more tools ↓
create_repositoryno sensitive capabilitydecline_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitydelete_attachmentno sensitive capabilitydelete_attachment_metadatano sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitydelete_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_pull_request_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_repositoryno sensitive capabilitydelete_tagno sensitive capabilityfind_fileno sensitive capabilityfind_userno sensitive capabilityget_attachmentno sensitive capabilityget_attachment_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_commitno sensitive capabilityget_commit_changesno sensitive capabilityget_commit_diffno sensitive capabilityget_commit_message_suggestionno sensitive capabilityget_default_branchno sensitive capabilityget_file_contentno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_activitiesno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_diffno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_diff_statno sensitive capabilityget_pull_request_taskno sensitive capabilityget_repositoryno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_dashboard_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_inbox_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_participantsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_request_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_repositoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilitypublish_draft_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_change_request_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityreopen_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityreopen_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilityrequest_changes_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityresolve_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilitysave_attachment_metadatano sensitive capabilitysearch_codeno sensitive capabilityunapprove_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityunwatch_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_request_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_request_taskno sensitive capabilitywatch_pull_requestno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan bitbucket-server-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Bitbucket Server 24
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →
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MCP server for Bitbucket Cloud — read and manage pull requests, branches, and repositories from any MCP client
MCP server for Bitbucket API integration - supports both Cloud and Server
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