Bitbucket (PyPI) MCP Server

bitbucket-mcp PyPI v0.5.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

MCP server for comprehensive Bitbucket Cloud API integration

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get_file_contents]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, delete_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get_file_contents] → sinks [create_issue, create_pull_request, create_webhook, delete_webhook]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get_file_contents → create_issue

Tools 79

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_issuenetwork egress
  • create_pull_requestnetwork egress
  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • get_file_contentsreads sensitive data
  • add_inline_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_issue_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_pull_request_commentno sensitive capability
  • add_reviewerno sensitive capability
  • approve_pull_requestno sensitive capability
Show 69 more tools ↓
  • create_branchno sensitive capability
  • create_build_statusno sensitive capability
  • create_pipeline_variableno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_snippetno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • decline_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • delete_branchno sensitive capability
  • delete_commentno sensitive capability
  • delete_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • delete_snippetno sensitive capability
  • delete_tagno sensitive capability
  • fork_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_branching_modelno sensitive capability
  • get_commitno sensitive capability
  • get_commit_diffno sensitive capability
  • get_commit_diffstatno sensitive capability
  • get_config_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_current_userno sensitive capability
  • get_default_reviewersno sensitive capability
  • get_issueno sensitive capability
  • get_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • get_pipeline_step_logno sensitive capability
  • get_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_activityno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_commentsno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_commitsno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_diffno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_diffstatno sensitive capability
  • get_pull_request_merge_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_snippetno sensitive capability
  • get_user_permissionsno sensitive capability
  • get_user_profileno sensitive capability
  • get_workspace_detailsno sensitive capability
  • list_branchesno sensitive capability
  • list_commit_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_commit_statusesno sensitive capability
  • list_commitsno sensitive capability
  • list_issue_commentsno sensitive capability
  • list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • list_pipeline_stepsno sensitive capability
  • list_pipeline_variablesno sensitive capability
  • list_pipelinesno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_pull_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_repository_forksno sensitive capability
  • list_snippetsno sensitive capability
  • list_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_workspace_membersno sensitive capability
  • list_workspace_permissionsno sensitive capability
  • list_workspace_webhooksno sensitive capability
  • list_workspacesno sensitive capability
  • merge_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • remove_reviewerno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_commentno sensitive capability
  • request_changes_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • search_codeno sensitive capability
  • setup_bitbucketno sensitive capability
  • stop_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • trigger_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • unapprove_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_issueno sensitive capability
  • update_pull_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_repositoryno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.5.0 latest A 92/100 1 1.13.0 2026-08-25

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan bitbucket-mcp --online --registry pypi

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Bitbucket 24

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →

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