Mcpvault (bitbonsai) MCP Server
@bitbonsai/mcpvault
npm
v0.16.0
Published by @bitbonsai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal AI bridge for Obsidian vaults - connect any MCP-compatible assistant
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_directory"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_directory" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_directory · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 18
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_directoryreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesdelete_noteno sensitive capabilityget_frontmatterno sensitive capabilityget_note_outlineno sensitive capabilityget_notes_infono sensitive capabilityget_vault_statsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_tagsno sensitive capabilitymanage_tagsno sensitive capabilitymove_noteno sensitive capability
Show 8 more tools ↓
patch_noteno sensitive capabilityread_multiple_notesno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityread_note_linesno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilityupdate_frontmatterno sensitive capabilitywiki_linkno sensitive capabilitywrite_noteno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (18 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.15.0 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.14.1 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v0.12.6 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v0.12.5 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v0.12.4 |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.12.2 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v0.12.1 |
A 100/100 | 0 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @bitbonsai/mcpvault --onlineOther implementations of Mcpvault 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
AI bridge for Obsidian vaults - forked from mcpvault
Local MCP credential vault — multi-account credentials for AI agents (Claude, Cursor, Codex, custom MCP clients).
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