Bingzi 233 Ssh (bingzi-233) MCP Server

@bingzi-233/ssh-mcp npm v1.5.1 Source verified

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纯命令行 SSH/SFTP 工具：在多台远程服务器上执行命令、传输大文件（断点续传）。支持 CLI 模式和 MCP stdio 模式。

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Trust grade

94/100

Last scanned 2026-09-07 get badge →

Trust

A · 94/100

Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.

Capability

High

Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.

Coverage

Source

How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.

A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 94/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

Points	Adoption-risk factor
−6	capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 18

high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-006

In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:940`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: rivateKeyPath": "~/.ssh/id_rsa" } ] } 各子命令详细用法请运行: ssh-mcp <子命令> --help `); } // -------------------------

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/index.js

high Tool "run_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "run_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool run_command

high Tool "batch_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "batch_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool batch_run

high Tool "exec_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "exec_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool exec_script

high Tool "start_watch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "start_watch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool start_watch

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run_command, upload_file, batch_run, exec_script, start_watch, http_request]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_file] → sinks [run_command, upload_file, batch_run, exec_script, start_watch, http_request]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_file → run_command

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "http_request"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "http_request" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool http_request · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Tool "remove_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "remove_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "remove_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool remove_file

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "run_command"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "run_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool run_command · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "batch_run"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "batch_run" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool batch_run · inputSchema.properties.command

medium Unconstrained command parameter "local_script" on "exec_script"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "exec_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "local_script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool exec_script · inputSchema.properties.local_script

medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "start_watch"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "start_watch" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool start_watch · inputSchema.properties.command

low Mutating tool "run_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "run_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.