Bind Protocol — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@bind-protocol/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@bind-protocol/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@bind-protocol/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 95,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1470`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "\\n const res = await fetch(`https://api.creditprovider.com/scores/${query.userId}`, {\\n headers: { 'Authorizatio",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 1470,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@bind-protocol/mcp-server\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@bind-protocol/mcp-server"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "bind_parse_credential",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_verify_credential",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bind_hash_credential",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_resolve_issuer",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_explain_policy",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "bind_check_revocation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_list_policies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_list_circuits",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_submit_prove_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_get_prove_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_list_prove_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_issue_credential",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_share_proof",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_list_shared_proofs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_create_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_validate_policy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_generate_circuit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_get_circuit_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_activate_circuit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_record_receipt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_list_receipts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_verify_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bind_receipt_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "fd48c1833f3bada40515e055f63142f9a5d6ba049ba1209487227f25ff3ad72b",
"stats": {
"tools": 24,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}