Binalyze Air MCP Server

@binalyze/air-mcp npm v12.4.1

Published by @binalyze — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Binalyze AIR MCP Server

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([download_case_ppc, download_task_report]) co-exist with external-action tools ([call_webhook, post_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [download_case_ppc, download_task_report] → sinks [call_webhook, post_webhook]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow download_case_ppc → call_webhook

Tools 116

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • call_webhooknetwork egress
  • download_case_ppcingests untrusted input
  • download_task_reportingests untrusted input
  • post_webhooknetwork egress
  • acquire_baselineno sensitive capability
  • add_note_to_caseno sensitive capability
  • add_tags_to_assetsno sensitive capability
  • add_tags_to_organizationno sensitive capability
  • archive_case_by_idno sensitive capability
  • assign_acquisition_taskno sensitive capability
Show 106 more tools ↓
  • assign_image_acquisition_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_isolation_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_log_retrieval_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_reboot_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_shutdown_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_triage_taskno sensitive capability
  • assign_users_to_organizationno sensitive capability
  • assign_version_update_taskno sensitive capability
  • cancel_task_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • cancel_task_by_idno sensitive capability
  • change_case_ownerno sensitive capability
  • check_case_nameno sensitive capability
  • check_organization_name_existsno sensitive capability
  • close_case_by_idno sensitive capability
  • compare_baselineno sensitive capability
  • create_acquisition_profileno sensitive capability
  • create_amazon_s3_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_auto_asset_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_azure_storage_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_caseno sensitive capability
  • create_ftps_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_organizationno sensitive capability
  • create_policyno sensitive capability
  • create_sftp_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_smb_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_triage_ruleno sensitive capability
  • create_triage_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_auto_asset_tag_by_idno sensitive capability
  • delete_note_from_caseno sensitive capability
  • delete_organizationno sensitive capability
  • delete_policy_by_idno sensitive capability
  • delete_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • delete_tags_from_organizationno sensitive capability
  • delete_task_assignmentno sensitive capability
  • delete_task_by_idno sensitive capability
  • delete_triage_ruleno sensitive capability
  • export_audit_logsno sensitive capability
  • export_case_activitiesno sensitive capability
  • export_case_endpointsno sensitive capability
  • export_case_notesno sensitive capability
  • export_casesno sensitive capability
  • get_acquisition_profile_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_asset_tasks_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_auto_asset_tag_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_case_activitiesno sensitive capability
  • get_case_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_case_endpointsno sensitive capability
  • get_case_tasks_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_case_usersno sensitive capability
  • get_comparison_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_organization_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_organization_usersno sensitive capability
  • get_policy_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_policy_match_statsno sensitive capability
  • get_report_file_infono sensitive capability
  • get_repository_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_shareable_deployment_infono sensitive capability
  • get_task_assignmentsno sensitive capability
  • get_task_assignments_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_task_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_triage_rule_by_idno sensitive capability
  • get_user_by_idno sensitive capability
  • import_task_assignments_to_caseno sensitive capability
  • list_acquisition_artifactsno sensitive capability
  • list_acquisition_profilesno sensitive capability
  • list_assetsno sensitive capability
  • list_audit_logsno sensitive capability
  • list_auto_asset_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_casesno sensitive capability
  • list_drone_analyzersno sensitive capability
  • list_e_discovery_patternsno sensitive capability
  • list_organizationsno sensitive capability
  • list_policiesno sensitive capability
  • list_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • list_tasksno sensitive capability
  • list_triage_rulesno sensitive capability
  • list_triage_tagsno sensitive capability
  • list_usersno sensitive capability
  • open_case_by_idno sensitive capability
  • purge_and_uninstall_assetsno sensitive capability
  • remove_endpoints_from_caseno sensitive capability
  • remove_tags_from_assetsno sensitive capability
  • remove_task_assignment_from_caseno sensitive capability
  • remove_user_from_organizationno sensitive capability
  • start_taggingno sensitive capability
  • uninstall_assetsno sensitive capability
  • update_amazon_s3_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • update_auto_asset_tagno sensitive capability
  • update_azure_storage_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • update_banner_messageno sensitive capability
  • update_caseno sensitive capability
  • update_ftps_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • update_note_in_caseno sensitive capability
  • update_organization_by_idno sensitive capability
  • update_organization_deployment_tokenno sensitive capability
  • update_organization_shareable_deploymentno sensitive capability
  • update_policyno sensitive capability
  • update_policy_prioritiesno sensitive capability
  • update_sftp_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • update_smb_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • update_triage_ruleno sensitive capability
  • validate_amazon_s3_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • validate_azure_storage_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • validate_ftps_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • validate_triage_ruleno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v12.4.1 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-08

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

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Other implementations of Binalyze Air 2

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →

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