Billy MCP Server
billy-mcp
npm
v0.3.2
Published by thourum — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Billy (billy.dk) accounting — connect Claude and other AI assistants to your Danish bookkeeping: invoices, bills, journal entries, trial balance, bank reconciliation. With human-approval write protection.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "attach_file"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "attach_file" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow attach_file
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files, attach_file]) and tools that can send data out ([upload_file, attach_file, execute_script]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files, attach_file] → sinks [upload_file, attach_file, execute_script]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → upload_file
high Tool "execute_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "execute_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_script · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "execute_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_script
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
attach_filereads sensitive datanetwork egressexecute_scriptruns code / shelllist_filesreads sensitive dataupload_filenetwork egressapprove_invoiceno sensitive capabilitybatch_void_daybook_transactionsno sensitive capabilitybilly_raw_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_bank_paymentno sensitive capabilitycreate_billno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
create_contact_personno sensitive capabilitycreate_daybook_transactionno sensitive capabilitycreate_invoiceno sensitive capabilitycreate_productno sensitive capabilitydelete_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_account_balancesno sensitive capabilityget_billno sensitive capabilityget_contactno sensitive capabilityget_invoiceno sensitive capabilityget_organizationno sensitive capabilityget_productno sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_balance_modifiersno sensitive capabilitylist_bank_line_matchesno sensitive capabilitylist_bank_linesno sensitive capabilitylist_bank_paymentsno sensitive capabilitylist_billsno sensitive capabilitylist_contact_personsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_daybook_transactionsno sensitive capabilitylist_daybooksno sensitive capabilitylist_invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist_postingsno sensitive capabilitylist_productsno sensitive capabilitylist_transactionsno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_productno sensitive capabilityvoid_daybook_transactionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan billy-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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