Billforward MCP Server
billforward-mcp
npm
v2.0.1
Published by gregorisoria — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for integrating Billforward's billing API with LLMs.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 4 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (build/tools/search/unified.test.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `build/tools/search/unified.test.js:55`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server build/tools/search/unified.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/protocol.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/protocol.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; const __dirname =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/protocol.test.js
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
call-apinetwork egresscancel-subscriptionno sensitive capabilitycreate-chargeno sensitive capabilitycreate-subscriptionno sensitive capabilitydescribe-toolno sensitive capabilityfind-accountsno sensitive capabilityget-account-historyno sensitive capabilityget-customer-summaryno sensitive capabilityget-invoiceno sensitive capabilityget-meno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
get-metadata-schemano sensitive capabilityget-paymentno sensitive capabilityget-rate-planno sensitive capabilityget-subscriptionno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilityissue-invoiceno sensitive capabilitylist-invoicesno sensitive capabilitylist-paymentsno sensitive capabilitylist-product-rate-plansno sensitive capabilitylist-productsno sensitive capabilitylist-receiptsno sensitive capabilitylist-subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylookupno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch-toolsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.1 latest |
A 95/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.3.0 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v1.2.1 |
A 98/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v1.2.0 |
A 99/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan billforward-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
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