Hx Multianim MCP Server

@bh213/hx-multianim-mcp npm v1.15.0 Source verified

Published by bh213 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.

MCP server for inspecting and manipulating running hx-multianim applications

Trust grade
A
90/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 90/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Critical
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 90/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 10 = 90. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−10 capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_game_events → scene_graph → eval_manim. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow get_game_events → scene_graph → eval_manim

high Tool "eval_manim" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "eval_manim" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool eval_manim

low Mutating tool "eval_manim" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "eval_manim" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool eval_manim

Tools 38

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • eval_manimruns code / shell
  • get_game_eventsingests untrusted input
  • scene_graphreads sensitive data
  • check_overlapsno sensitive capability
  • click_buttonno sensitive capability
  • connectno sensitive capability
  • coordinate_transformno sensitive capability
  • find_element_atno sensitive capability
  • game_opno sensitive capability
  • get_debugger_hitsno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
  • get_errorsno sensitive capability
  • get_parametersno sensitive capability
  • get_screen_stateno sensitive capability
  • get_tracesno sensitive capability
  • get_tween_stateno sensitive capability
  • inspect_elementno sensitive capability
  • inspect_programmableno sensitive capability
  • list_active_programmablesno sensitive capability
  • list_atlasesno sensitive capability
  • list_buildersno sensitive capability
  • list_fontsno sensitive capability
  • list_game_opsno sensitive capability
  • list_interactivesno sensitive capability
  • list_resourcesno sensitive capability
  • list_screensno sensitive capability
  • list_slotsno sensitive capability
  • pauseno sensitive capability
  • performanceno sensitive capability
  • pingno sensitive capability
  • quitno sensitive capability
  • reloadno sensitive capability
  • screenshotno sensitive capability
  • send_eventno sensitive capability
  • send_eventsno sensitive capability
  • set_parameterno sensitive capability
  • set_visibilityno sensitive capability
  • stepno sensitive capability
  • wait_for_idleno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.15.0 latest A 90/100 3 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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MCP Trust Score: A · 90/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @bh213/hx-multianim-mcp --online

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