Ben Music MCP Server
ben-music-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.22
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
本的乐mcp服务
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ben_music_mcp/action.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ben_music_mcp/action.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: found: subprocess.Popen(path_to_use) time.sleep(2) # 等待程序启动 return {"cod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ben_music_mcp/action.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ben_music_mcp/tool.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ben_music_mcp/tool.py:642`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: """ try: subprocess.Popen(exe_path) return {"code": 200, "msg": "网易云音乐已启动", "exe_path": exe_path
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ben_music_mcp/tool.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/ben_music_mcp/html_template.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/ben_music_mcp/html_template.py:538`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .all([ fetch(`https://music-api.gdstudio.xyz/api.php?types=lyric&source=netease&id=${{songId}}`),
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ben_music_mcp/html_template.py
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_playlist_csvno sensitive capabilityexport_playlist_htmlno sensitive capabilityget_artist_hot_songsno sensitive capabilityget_artist_infono sensitive capabilityget_music_urlno sensitive capabilityget_playlistno sensitive capabilityget_similar_songsno sensitive capabilityget_song_commentno sensitive capabilityget_song_infono sensitive capabilityget_style_songsno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
get_toplistno sensitive capabilityget_user_playlistno sensitive capabilityhellono sensitive capabilitylyricno sensitive capabilitynext_songno sensitive capabilityopen_cloud_musicno sensitive capabilityplay_and_pause_mcpno sensitive capabilitypre_songno sensitive capabilityreturn_stylelistno sensitive capabilityreturn_toplist_nameno sensitive capabilitysearch_and_play_mcpno sensitive capabilitysearch_artistno sensitive capabilitysongs_recognizeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.22 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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