Repsona MCP Server
@bellx2/repsona-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.7
Published by @bellx2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Repsona MCP Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_file] → sinks [upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_file → upload_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 52
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesdownload_fileingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressarchive_all_inboxno sensitive capabilityattach_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_note_commentno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_task_commentno sensitive capability
Show 42 more tools ↓
delete_project_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_project_note_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_task_commentno sensitive capabilitydetach_fileno sensitive capabilityget_all_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_feedno sensitive capabilityget_inboxno sensitive capabilityget_inbox_unread_countno sensitive capabilityget_meno sensitive capabilityget_membersno sensitive capabilityget_my_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_my_tasksno sensitive capabilityget_my_tasks_countno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_project_activityno sensitive capabilityget_project_milestonesno sensitive capabilityget_project_noteno sensitive capabilityget_project_note_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_project_note_childrenno sensitive capabilityget_project_note_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_project_note_historyno sensitive capabilityget_project_notesno sensitive capabilityget_project_statusesno sensitive capabilityget_project_usersno sensitive capabilityget_projectsno sensitive capabilityget_space_infono sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_task_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_task_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_task_historyno sensitive capabilityget_task_subtasksno sensitive capabilityget_tasksno sensitive capabilityinvite_to_spaceno sensitive capabilityupdate_inboxno sensitive capabilityupdate_meno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_note_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_user_roleno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.7 latest |
A 96/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @bellx2/repsona-mcp-server --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.