Basecamp (stefanoverna) MCP Server
basecamp-mcp
npm
v1.2.2
Published by stefanoverna — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Basecamp integration. Enables LLMs to interact with Basecamp projects, messages, todos, comments, people, and kanban boards.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 11 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: basecamp_download_blob → basecamp_list_uploads ⇒ basecamp_create_comment. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow basecamp_download_blob → basecamp_list_uploads → basecamp_create_comment
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/oauth.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/oauth.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { createServer, } from "node:http"; import { platform } from "node:os"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/oauth.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/oauth.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/oauth.js:29`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tart" : "xdg-open"; exec(`${cmd} "${url}"`); } async function exchangeCodeForTokens(code, clientId, clientSecret) {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/oauth.js
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
basecamp_create_commentnetwork egressbasecamp_download_blobingests untrusted inputbasecamp_get_projectingests untrusted inputbasecamp_list_campfire_messagesingests untrusted inputbasecamp_list_recordingsingests untrusted inputbasecamp_list_uploadsreads sensitive databasecamp_complete_todono sensitive capabilitybasecamp_create_answerno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_create_documentno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_create_kanban_cardno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
basecamp_create_messageno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_create_todono sensitive capabilitybasecamp_create_vaultno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_answerno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_documentno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_kanban_cardno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_meno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_messageno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_personno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_questionno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_questionnaireno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_todosetno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_uploadno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_get_vaultno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_answersno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_commentsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_documentsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_kanban_cardsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_kanban_columnsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_message_typesno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_messagesno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_peopleno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_questionsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_todosno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_list_vaultsno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_loginno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_logoutno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_move_kanban_cardno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_uncomplete_todono sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_commentno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_documentno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_kanban_cardno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_messageno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_todono sensitive capabilitybasecamp_update_vaultno sensitive capabilitybasecamp_whoamino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.2 latest |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.1 |
B 83/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan basecamp-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Basecamp 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
Basecamp MCP server for Claude — read and search Basecamp with your own API access
Security scan results for the Basecamp (npm) MCP server.
More in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.