Barresider X — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@barresider/x-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@barresider/x-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@barresider/x-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([scrape_posts, scrape_profile, scrape_comments, scrape_timeline, scrape_trending]) co-exist with external-action tools ([tweet, quote_tweet]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "scrape_posts → tweet"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [scrape_posts, scrape_profile, scrape_comments, scrape_timeline, scrape_trending] → sinks [tweet, quote_tweet]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"scrape_posts",
"scrape_profile",
"scrape_comments",
"scrape_timeline",
"scrape_trending"
],
"sinks": [
"tweet",
"quote_tweet"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"scrape_posts",
"scrape_profile",
"scrape_comments",
"scrape_timeline",
"scrape_trending"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"tweet",
"quote_tweet"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "thread",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scrape_posts",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "scrape_profile",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "scrape_comments",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search_twitter",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_viral",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scrape_timeline",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "scrape_trending",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"scrape\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "like_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlike_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bookmark_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unbookmark_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "retweet_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unretweet_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "quote_tweet",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"tweet\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "like_comment_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unlike_comment_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply_to_comment_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "replace_comment_by_id",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a7478480b47ff955206944d4e7f8bc3a889b7ddda4989f331a2a373455064751",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}