Xcode (baochuquan) MCP Server
@baochuquan/xcode-mcp
npm
v0.2.0
Published by @baochuquan — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Xcode integration, installable via npx
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/project/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/project/index.js:207`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: File2 } = await import("child_process"); const execFileAsync = promisify2(execFile2); await exec
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/project/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/execFile.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/execFile.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; import { CommandExecutionError } from "./error
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/execFile.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/external.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/external.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const pExecFile = promisify(execFile); co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/external.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 76
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesdump_swift_packagereads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesread_filereads sensitive datawrite_filewrites filesadd_file_to_projectno sensitive capabilityadd_project_to_workspaceno sensitive capabilityadd_swift_packageno sensitive capabilityanalyze_fileno sensitive capabilityarchive_projectno sensitive capability
Show 66 more tools ↓
boot_simulatorno sensitive capabilitybuild_projectno sensitive capabilitybuild_spm_packageno sensitive capabilitybuild_swift_packageno sensitive capabilitychange_directoryno sensitive capabilitycheck_cocoapodsno sensitive capabilitycheck_file_existsno sensitive capabilityclean_projectno sensitive capabilityclean_swift_packageno sensitive capabilitycompile_asset_catalogno sensitive capabilitycopy_fileno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_workspaceno sensitive capabilitycreate_xcode_projectno sensitive capabilitydetect_active_projectno sensitive capabilityedit_package_swiftno sensitive capabilityexport_archiveno sensitive capabilityfind_filesno sensitive capabilityfind_projectsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_icon_setno sensitive capabilitygenerate_swift_docsno sensitive capabilityget_active_projectno sensitive capabilityget_current_directoryno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_package_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_configurationno sensitive capabilityget_xcode_infono sensitive capabilityinit_swift_packageno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_available_destinationsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_schemesno sensitive capabilitylist_booted_simulatorsno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_installed_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_project_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_simulatorsno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilitypod_deintegrateno sensitive capabilitypod_initno sensitive capabilitypod_installno sensitive capabilitypod_outdatedno sensitive capabilitypod_repo_updateno sensitive capabilitypod_updateno sensitive capabilitypop_directoryno sensitive capabilitypush_directoryno sensitive capabilityremove_swift_packageno sensitive capabilityreset_simulatorno sensitive capabilityresolve_pathno sensitive capabilityrun_lldbno sensitive capabilityrun_testsno sensitive capabilityrun_xcrunno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_filesno sensitive capabilityset_project_pathno sensitive capabilityset_projects_base_dirno sensitive capabilityshow_swift_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityshutdown_simulatorno sensitive capabilityswift_package_commandno sensitive capabilityswitch_xcodeno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilityterminate_appno sensitive capabilitytest_spm_packageno sensitive capabilitytest_swift_packageno sensitive capabilitytrace_appno sensitive capabilityupdate_swift_packageno sensitive capabilityvalidate_appno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (76 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @baochuquan/xcode-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Xcode 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
RENAMED to drews-xcode-mcp - this compatibility package forwards to it
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MCP server for Xcode - build, test, run, and manage Apple platform projects (iOS, macOS, tvOS, watchOS, visionOS)
MCP server for interacting with Xcode build and simulator tools
Security scan results for the Xcode (npm) MCP server.
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