Bangersss MCP Server
bangersss-mcp
npm
v0.3.4
Published by albinekb — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for organizing music with LLM assistance - built for DJs
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/audio/audio-decoder.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/audio/audio-decoder.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { access, constants } from 'node:f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/audio/audio-decoder.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/audio/key-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/audio/key-analyzer.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { access, constants } from 'node:f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/audio/key-analyzer.js
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
move_filewrites filesadd_to_planno sensitive capabilityadd_to_playlistno sensitive capabilityanalyze_bpmno sensitive capabilityanalyze_incomingno sensitive capabilityanalyze_keyno sensitive capabilitybatch_analyze_bpmno sensitive capabilitybatch_analyze_keyno sensitive capabilitybatch_read_tagsno sensitive capabilitybatch_renameno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
check_duplicatesno sensitive capabilitycheck_key_compatibilityno sensitive capabilitycommit_changesno sensitive capabilitycommit_selectiveno sensitive capabilityconvert_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_planno sensitive capabilitycreate_playlistno sensitive capabilitydiscard_changesno sensitive capabilityedj_add_to_crateno sensitive capabilityedj_connectno sensitive capabilityedj_create_crateno sensitive capabilityedj_get_crate_tracksno sensitive capabilityedj_library_statsno sensitive capabilityedj_list_cratesno sensitive capabilityedj_search_tracksno sensitive capabilityexecute_planno sensitive capabilityexport_planno sensitive capabilityexport_playlistno sensitive capabilityget_compatible_keysno sensitive capabilityget_key_infono sensitive capabilityget_pending_changesno sensitive capabilityimport_planno sensitive capabilitylist_all_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_audio_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_plansno sensitive capabilitylist_playlistsno sensitive capabilityorganize_filesno sensitive capabilitypreview_changeno sensitive capabilityquick_ingestno sensitive capabilityrb_add_to_playlistno sensitive capabilityrb_connectno sensitive capabilityrb_create_playlistno sensitive capabilityrb_get_cue_pointsno sensitive capabilityrb_get_playlist_tracksno sensitive capabilityrb_library_statsno sensitive capabilityrb_list_playlistsno sensitive capabilityrb_search_tracksno sensitive capabilityread_playlistno sensitive capabilityread_tagsno sensitive capabilityremove_from_playlistno sensitive capabilityrename_fileno sensitive capabilityresume_planno sensitive capabilityscan_directoryno sensitive capabilityscan_incomingno sensitive capabilitystage_ingestno sensitive capabilitysuggest_tagsno sensitive capabilityview_planno sensitive capabilitywrite_tagsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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