Agent MCP Server
@bang_imvt/mcp-agent
npm
v1.0.3
Published by @bang_imvt — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Agent for ZCam cameras with discovery, control, and streaming capabilities
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/zcam-mcp-agent.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/zcam-mcp-agent.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const os = require('os'); // Get the directory o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/zcam-mcp-agent.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-python-deps.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-python-deps.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); // Determine the appropriate wheel file based on the
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install-python-deps.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@bang_imvt/mcp-agent" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/install-python-deps.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @bang_imvt/mcp-agent
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
control_audiono sensitive capabilitycontrol_connect_camerano sensitive capabilitycontrol_exposureno sensitive capabilitycontrol_exposure_modeno sensitive capabilitycontrol_focusno sensitive capabilitycontrol_focus_settingsno sensitive capabilitycontrol_image_profileno sensitive capabilitycontrol_image_settingsno sensitive capabilitycontrol_networkno sensitive capabilitycontrol_preset_recallno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
control_preset_saveno sensitive capabilitycontrol_ptz_moveno sensitive capabilitycontrol_recording_startno sensitive capabilitycontrol_recording_stopno sensitive capabilitycontrol_rtmp_streamingno sensitive capabilitycontrol_streaming_setupno sensitive capabilitycontrol_systemno sensitive capabilitycontrol_white_balanceno sensitive capabilitycontrol_zoomno sensitive capabilitydiscover_camera_by_modelno sensitive capabilitydiscover_camerasno sensitive capabilitystream_capture_frameno sensitive capabilitystream_connectno sensitive capabilitystream_disconnectno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (24 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.3 latest |
A 91/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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