Azure Utils MCP Server
azure-utils-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.0
Published by briandeacon — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Azure Service Bus, Cosmos DB, and PIM role management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/azure_utils_mcp/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/azure_utils_mcp/client.py:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["az", "account", "show", "--query", "id", "-o", "tsv"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azure_utils_mcp/client.py
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
servicebus_send_messagenetwork egressauthorization_activate_roleno sensitive capabilityauthorization_list_eligible_rolesno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_count_itemsno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_delete_itemno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_get_container_infono sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_list_accountsno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_list_containersno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_list_databasesno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_query_itemsno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
cosmosdb_query_items_to_fileno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_read_itemno sensitive capabilitycosmosdb_upsert_itemno sensitive capabilityservicebus_list_namespacesno sensitive capabilityservicebus_list_queuesno sensitive capabilityservicebus_list_topicsno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_dlq_to_fileno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_messagesno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_messages_to_fileno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_subscription_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_subscription_dlq_to_fileno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_subscription_messagesno sensitive capabilityservicebus_peek_subscription_messages_to_fileno sensitive capabilityservicebus_purge_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_purge_queueno sensitive capabilityservicebus_purge_subscriptionno sensitive capabilityservicebus_purge_subscription_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_requeue_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_requeue_subscription_dlqno sensitive capabilityservicebus_send_batchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan azure-utils-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Cloud & DevOps
Operator control CLI for AdGuard Home with an MCP adapter
interacting with Aliyun (Alibaba Cloud) services through This MCP server provides tools.
MCP server for the Aspro.Cloud REST API
MCP server for Atlassian Confluence and Jira Cloud APIs
AuroraCloud-first MCP server that exposes AuroraDocs workspace data to Claude Desktop and other AI agents
The official AWS Knowledge Base retrieval server using Bedrock Agent Runtime.