Azure Cloud Master MCP Server
azure-cloud-master-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server that acts as an Azure cloud engineer - plans, provisions, analyzes, and optimizes Azure resources via az CLI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Tool "azure_execute_commands" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "azure_execute_commands" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool azure_execute_commands
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/az-executor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/az-executor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ckAzCliInstalled; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); function executeAzCommand(command, timeoutMs = 60000
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/az-executor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/az-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/az-executor.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; export interface AzResult { success: boolean; data: any; error
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/az-executor.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/az-executor.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/az-executor.ts:13`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync(`${fullCommand} --output json`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeout:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/az-executor.ts
low Mutating tool "azure_execute_commands" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "azure_execute_commands" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool azure_execute_commands
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
azure_execute_commandsruns code / shellazure_analyze_acrno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_aksno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_appgwno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_appservice_trafficno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_cosmosdbno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_entraidno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_iamno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_keyvaultno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_nsgno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
azure_analyze_resourcesno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_sqldbno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_storageno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_vmno sensitive capabilityazure_analyze_vnetno sensitive capabilityazure_apply_best_practiceno sensitive capabilityazure_check_authno sensitive capabilityazure_cost_analysisno sensitive capabilityazure_generate_planno sensitive capabilityazure_list_resource_groupsno sensitive capabilityazure_list_resourcesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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