Azops MCP Server
azops-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by artemkozlenkov — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Azure Infrastructure MCP Server – manage Azure resources from any MCP-compatible AI assistant
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/azops_mcp/tools/docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/azops_mcp/tools/docker.py:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nstead result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "ps", "--format", "{{.ID}}\t{{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}\t{{.I
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azops_mcp/tools/docker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/azops_mcp/tools/monitoring.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/azops_mcp/tools/monitoring.py:25`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ge result = subprocess.run( ["top", "-bn1", "|", "grep", "Cpu(s)"], capture_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azops_mcp/tools/monitoring.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/azops_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/azops_mcp/server.py:78`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(path) deps[pkg] = "ok" except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/azops_mcp/server.py
Tools 93
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
acr_get_credentialsreads sensitive dataaad_create_applicationno sensitive capabilityaad_create_userno sensitive capabilityaad_delete_userno sensitive capabilityaad_list_applicationsno sensitive capabilityaad_list_groupsno sensitive capabilityaad_list_usersno sensitive capabilityaad_reset_clientno sensitive capabilityaad_show_userno sensitive capabilityaad_verify_tenantno sensitive capability
Show 83 more tools ↓
account_clearno sensitive capabilityaccount_get_access_tokenno sensitive capabilityaccount_showno sensitive capabilityacr_create_registryno sensitive capabilityacr_create_taskno sensitive capabilityacr_delete_registryno sensitive capabilityacr_delete_taskno sensitive capabilityacr_get_login_serverno sensitive capabilityacr_list_buildsno sensitive capabilityacr_list_network_rulesno sensitive capabilityacr_list_registriesno sensitive capabilityacr_list_repositoriesno sensitive capabilityacr_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityacr_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityacr_reset_clientno sensitive capabilityacr_run_taskno sensitive capabilityacr_show_quotasno sensitive capabilityacr_show_registryno sensitive capabilityacr_show_taskno sensitive capabilityacr_show_usageno sensitive capabilityacr_update_network_rulesno sensitive capabilityacr_update_registryno sensitive capabilityappconfig_kv_deleteno sensitive capabilityappconfig_kv_listno sensitive capabilityappconfig_kv_setno sensitive capabilityappconfig_kv_showno sensitive capabilityappconfig_listno sensitive capabilityappconfig_showno sensitive capabilityappservice_plan_listno sensitive capabilityappservice_plan_showno sensitive capabilityauth_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_service_healthno sensitive capabilitycreate_role_assignmentno sensitive capabilitydeallocate_vmno sensitive capabilitydelete_role_assignmentno sensitive capabilityget_activity_logno sensitive capabilityget_container_logsno sensitive capabilityget_infrastructure_statusno sensitive capabilityget_management_groupno sensitive capabilityget_storage_statusno sensitive capabilityget_system_metricsno sensitive capabilityget_vm_statusno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_locationsno sensitive capabilitylist_management_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_resource_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_resource_locksno sensitive capabilitylist_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_role_assignments_for_principalno sensitive capabilitylist_role_definitionsno sensitive capabilitylist_storage_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_tenantsno sensitive capabilitylist_vmsno sensitive capabilityrestart_containerno sensitive capabilityrestart_vmno sensitive capabilityscale_vmssno sensitive capabilityset_subscriptionno sensitive capabilitystart_vmno sensitive capabilitystop_vmno sensitive capabilityvnet_createno sensitive capabilityvnet_deleteno sensitive capabilityvnet_listno sensitive capabilityvnet_peering_listno sensitive capabilityvnet_showno sensitive capabilityvnet_subnet_createno sensitive capabilityvnet_subnet_deleteno sensitive capabilityvnet_subnet_listno sensitive capabilityvnet_subnet_showno sensitive capabilitywebapp_assign_identityno sensitive capabilitywebapp_configure_vnet_integrationno sensitive capabilitywebapp_create_for_containerno sensitive capabilitywebapp_deleteno sensitive capabilitywebapp_grant_cr_accessno sensitive capabilitywebapp_listno sensitive capabilitywebapp_restartno sensitive capabilitywebapp_set_container_registry_credentialsno sensitive capabilitywebapp_showno sensitive capabilitywebapp_startno sensitive capabilitywebapp_stopno sensitive capabilitywebapp_view_logsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (93 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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