Ax Local Operations MCP Server
ax-local-operations-mcp
npm
v2.7.0
Published by andershsueh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
本地文件操作 MCP 服务器：安全的读写、编辑、搜索、比较、哈希、权限、压缩、监控、命令与任务管理工具集。
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/commandPolicy.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/commandPolicy.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const util = require('util'); const execAsync = util.promisify(exec); /** * 跨
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/commandPolicy.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/crossPlatformPermissions.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/crossPlatformPermissions.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const util = require('util'); const execAsync = util.promisify(exec); const pla
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/crossPlatformPermissions.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/sudoersConfigManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/sudoersConfigManager.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst { exec } = require('child_process'); const util = require('util'); const execAsync = util.promisify(exec); const pla
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/sudoersConfigManager.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/commandExecution.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/commandExecution.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { evaluate } = require('../lib/commandPolicy'); const { ERR } = require('
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/commandExecution.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/fileArchive.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/fileArchive.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { buildOutput } = require('../lib/output'); const { ERR } = require('../e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/fileArchive.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"ax-local-operations-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node ./bin/setup-workspace.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package ax-local-operations-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.7.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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