Aws (PyPI) MCP Server
aws-mcp
PyPI
v1.7.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
AWS Model Context Protocol Server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded AWS access key id in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 8 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/aws_mcp_server/resources.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/aws_mcp_server/resources.py:195`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nd(os.path.expanduser("~/.aws/credentials")) try: for config_path in config_paths: if not os.pa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/aws_mcp_server/resources.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/aws_mcp_server/sandbox.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/aws_mcp_server/sandbox.py:338`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: config) return subprocess.run( list(cmd), input=input_data, capture_output=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/aws_mcp_server/sandbox.py
low Hardcoded AWS access key id in test/example/packaging (tests/unit/test_resources.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded AWS access key id (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `tests/unit/test_resources.py:35`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/unit/test_resources.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:88`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["aws", "--version"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/conftest.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_aws_setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_aws_setup.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: talled.""" result = subprocess.run(["aws", "--version"], stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_aws_setup.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.0 latest |
A 91/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan aws-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Aws 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
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