Autousers MCP Server
@autousers/mcp
npm
v0.8.12
Source verified
Published by autousers-ai — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Official MCP server for Autousers — UX evaluation, calibrated AI personas, side-by-side design review.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/evaluations.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/evaluations.js:173`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tom dimensions for this eval (replaces the existing list). Each id MUST also appear in selectedDimensionIds. Internally
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/evaluations.js
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
autouser_run_getingests untrusted inputautousers_getingests untrusted inputevaluations_export_getingests untrusted inputevaluations_getingests untrusted inputteams_getingests untrusted inputtemplates_getingests untrusted inputautouser_run_turns_listno sensitive capabilityautouser_status_getno sensitive capabilityautousers_calibration_freezeno sensitive capabilityautousers_calibration_optimizeno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
autousers_calibration_startno sensitive capabilityautousers_calibration_status_getno sensitive capabilityautousers_createno sensitive capabilityautousers_deleteno sensitive capabilityautousers_duplicateno sensitive capabilityautousers_listno sensitive capabilityautousers_runno sensitive capabilityautousers_run_stopno sensitive capabilityautousers_updateno sensitive capabilityevaluations_agreement_getno sensitive capabilityevaluations_ai_insights_getno sensitive capabilityevaluations_createno sensitive capabilityevaluations_deleteno sensitive capabilityevaluations_listno sensitive capabilityevaluations_ratings_listno sensitive capabilityevaluations_results_getno sensitive capabilityevaluations_save_draftno sensitive capabilityevaluations_share_createno sensitive capabilityevaluations_shares_listno sensitive capabilityevaluations_transferno sensitive capabilityevaluations_updateno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilityteam_members_listno sensitive capabilityteams_listno sensitive capabilitytemplates_createno sensitive capabilitytemplates_deleteno sensitive capabilitytemplates_duplicateno sensitive capabilitytemplates_listno sensitive capabilitytemplates_updateno sensitive capabilityusage_getno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.12 latest |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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