Autonomath — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "autonomath-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "autonomath-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "autonomath-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"rule_tree_batch_eval_chain\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"rule_tree_batch_eval_chain\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"eval\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "rule_tree_batch_eval_chain"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/jpintel_mcp/mcp/jpcite_prompts.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/jpintel_mcp/mcp/jpcite_prompts.py:334`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/jpintel_mcp/mcp/jpcite_prompts.py"
},
"evidence": "nderer\": _renderer} exec(body_src, ns) # noqa: S102 — controlled scope, no external input cb = ns[\"_cb\"] cb",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/jpintel_mcp/mcp/jpcite_prompts.py",
"line": 334,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"rule_tree_batch_eval_chain\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"rule_tree_batch_eval_chain\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "rule_tree_batch_eval_chain"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "check_answer_freshness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compose_audit_workpaper",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "benchmark_cohort_average_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "case_law_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "case_law_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "case_law_to_law_refs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "predictive_subscriber_fanout_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_multi_step_eligibility_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "rule_tree_batch_eval_chain",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"eval\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "anonymized_cohort_query_with_redact_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "time_machine_snapshot_walk_chain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_citations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "case_cohort_match_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "match_cohort_5d_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_risk_score_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "supplier_chain_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "portfolio_optimize_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_compatibility_pair_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "apply_eligibility_chain_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_complementary_programs_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "simulate_application_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "track_amendment_lineage_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_active_periods_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "programs_by_corporate_form_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_eligibility_by_form_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_houjin_360_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_edinet_disclosures",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_invoice_by_houjin_partial",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_full_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "law_related_programs_cross",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cases_by_industry_size_pref",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cross_source_score_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_municipality_subsidies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_related",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_program_eligibility_predicate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dynamic_eligibility_check_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "program_eligibility_for_houjin_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_laws_en",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_law_article_en",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_tax_treaty",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_foreign_capital_eligibility",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_fdi_friendly_subsidies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_evidence_packet_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_evidence_packet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fact_signature_verify_am",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "2a063330a588b159ffef0cc1102242322f7df61d02447d405a4d87831b7bc9c4",
"stats": {
"tools": 45,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}