Automagik Tools MCP Server
automagik-tools
PyPI
v0.9.19
Published by namastexlabs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A monorepo package for MCP tools with dynamic loading capabilities - featuring Evolution API v2 WhatsApp integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (automagik_tools/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`automagik_tools/cli.py:576`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: script result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) if result.returncode == 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server automagik_tools/cli.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_media, read_messages, download_document]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_media, read_messages, download_document] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_media → send_message
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli_simple.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli_simple.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t help result = subprocess.run( ["python", "-c", "from automagik_tools.cli import app; app(['--help'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_cli_simple.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_integration.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_integration.py:115`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "0"} process = subprocess.Popen( [ sys.executable, "-m",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_integration.py
Tools 153
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_documentingests untrusted inputdownload_mediaingests untrusted inputread_messagesingests untrusted inputsend_messagenetwork egressaccess_mcp_resourceno sensitive capabilityactivate_promptno sensitive capabilityadd_contactno sensitive capabilityadd_sourceno sensitive capabilityask_genieno sensitive capabilitycall_mcp_toolno sensitive capability
Show 143 more tools ↓
chat_agentno sensitive capabilitycheck_is_whatsappno sensitive capabilitycheck_new_messagesno sensitive capabilitycheck_playground_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_workflow_progressno sensitive capabilityconfigure_mcp_serversno sensitive capabilityconnection_statusno sensitive capabilityconsult_geminino sensitive capabilitycontinue_agent_conversationno sensitive capabilityconvert_json_to_docsno sensitive capabilitycreate_instanceno sensitive capabilitycreate_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitycreate_memories_batchno sensitive capabilitycreate_memoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_promptno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_userno sensitive capabilitydeactivate_promptno sensitive capabilitydelete_agent_conversationno sensitive capabilitydelete_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitydelete_memoryno sensitive capabilitydelete_messageno sensitive capabilitydelete_promptno sensitive capabilitydelete_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_sessionno sensitive capabilitydelete_sourceno sensitive capabilitydelete_taskno sensitive capabilitydelete_team_collaborationno sensitive capabilitydelete_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_workflowno sensitive capabilitydelete_workflow_executionno sensitive capabilitydisable_scheduleno sensitive capabilityenable_scheduleno sensitive capabilityend_sessionno sensitive capabilityexecute_workflowno sensitive capabilityextract_placeholdersno sensitive capabilityfind_chatsno sensitive capabilityfind_messageno sensitive capabilityfind_personno sensitive capabilitygenie_clear_memoriesno sensitive capabilitygenie_memory_statsno sensitive capabilityget_claude_code_healthno sensitive capabilityget_claude_code_run_statusno sensitive capabilityget_gemini_requestsno sensitive capabilityget_group_membersno sensitive capabilityget_healthno sensitive capabilityget_health_statusno sensitive capabilityget_instance_infono sensitive capabilityget_mcp_healthno sensitive capabilityget_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityget_memoryno sensitive capabilityget_promptno sensitive capabilityget_remote_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_run_statusno sensitive capabilityget_scheduleno sensitive capabilityget_service_infono sensitive capabilityget_session_historyno sensitive capabilityget_sourceno sensitive capabilityget_specific_agent_conversationno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_team_collaboration_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_team_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilityget_workflowno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_execution_detailsno sensitive capabilityhub_infono sensitive capabilitylist_agent_mcp_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_workflowsno sensitive capabilitylist_claude_code_workflowsno sensitive capabilitylist_mcp_server_resourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_mcp_server_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_mcp_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_memoriesno sensitive capabilitylist_mounted_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_promptsno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_workflowsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_sourcesno sensitive capabilitylist_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_workflowsno sensitive capabilitymanage_chatsno sensitive capabilitymanage_contactsno sensitive capabilitymanage_instancesno sensitive capabilitymanage_profilesno sensitive capabilitymanage_tracesno sensitive capabilitymy_connectionsno sensitive capabilitymy_contactsno sensitive capabilitymy_conversationsno sensitive capabilitymy_whatsapp_infono sensitive capabilityreact_withno sensitive capabilityremove_contactno sensitive capabilityrename_agent_conversationno sensitive capabilityrename_team_collaborationno sensitive capabilityrename_workflow_executionno sensitive capabilityrestart_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityrun_agentno sensitive capabilityrun_agent_asyncno sensitive capabilityrun_claude_code_workflowno sensitive capabilityrun_workflowno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysend_audiono sensitive capabilitysend_contactno sensitive capabilitysend_locationno sensitive capabilitysend_mediano sensitive capabilitysend_pollno sensitive capabilitysend_presenceno sensitive capabilitysend_reactionno sensitive capabilitysend_stickerno sensitive capabilitysend_text_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_whatsappno sensitive capabilityshare_documentno sensitive capabilitystart_agent_conversationno sensitive capabilitystart_google_authno sensitive capabilitystart_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitystart_team_collaborationno sensitive capabilitystop_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilitysync_workflowno sensitive capabilitytalkno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_mcp_serverno sensitive capabilityupdate_memoryno sensitive capabilityupdate_messageno sensitive capabilityupdate_promptno sensitive capabilityupdate_scheduleno sensitive capabilityupdate_sourceno sensitive capabilityupdate_userno sensitive capabilityupload_templateno sensitive capabilityvalidate_json_datano sensitive capabilityview_agent_conversation_historyno sensitive capabilityview_agent_memoriesno sensitive capabilityview_team_collaboration_historyno sensitive capabilityview_team_memoriesno sensitive capabilityview_workflow_execution_historyno sensitive capabilitywait_minutesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (153 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.19 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan automagik-tools --online --registry pypiMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.