Autodevice MCP Server
autodevice-mcp
npm
v0.3.2
Source verified
Published by castleeason — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/archive.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/archive.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = require("node:child_process"); const { promisify } = require("node:util"); const execFileAsync = promisify(ex
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/archive.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/bootstrap.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/bootstrap.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = require("node:child_process"); const { promisify } = require("node:util"); const pkg = require("../package.jso
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/bootstrap.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/launch.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/launch.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = require("node:child_process"); /** Launches the Python MCP over inherited stdio and mirrors termination. */ f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/launch.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/python.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/python.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cFile } = require("node:child_process"); /** Returns the ordered Python commands appropriate for the current host. */ f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/python.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/execution/adapters/harmony.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/execution/adapters/harmony.py:171`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, timeout=timeout or self.timeout)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/execution/adapters/harmony.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/execution/command_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/execution/command_runner.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ate, values) return subprocess.run( argv, text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=fl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/execution/command_runner.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/execution/devices.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/execution/devices.py:970`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: output = subprocess.check_output(["hdc", "list", "targets"], text=True, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, timeout
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/execution/devices.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/execution/preflight.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/execution/preflight.py:238`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: output = subprocess.check_output(["adb", "devices"], text=True, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=5)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/execution/preflight.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/execution/wda_guardian.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/execution/wda_guardian.py:294`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as handle: subprocess.run( command, stdout=handle, stderr=s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/execution/wda_guardian.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mobile_auto_mcp/platform/processes.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/platform/processes.py:395`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed = subprocess.run( argv, capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/platform/processes.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (mobile_auto_mcp/mcp_tools/registry.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`mobile_auto_mcp/mcp_tools/registry.py:46`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(name) deps[name] = True except Exception as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mobile_auto_mcp/mcp_tools/registry.py
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"autodevice-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package autodevice-mcp
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_casesno sensitive capabilityapply_case_asset_overridesno sensitive capabilityapply_manual_reviewsno sensitive capabilityapply_visual_reviewsno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilitydevice_statusno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_environmentno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capabilityexecution_eventsno sensitive capabilityexport_reportno sensitive capability
Show 35 more tools ↓
extract_casesno sensitive capabilityget_current_appno sensitive capabilityget_run_statusno sensitive capabilityimport_casesno sensitive capabilityintent_clickno sensitive capabilitylatest_reportno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_elementsno sensitive capabilitylist_rulesno sensitive capabilitynavigate_pathno sensitive capabilitypage_knowledgeno sensitive capabilitypreflightno sensitive capabilityprepare_runno sensitive capabilityprepare_visual_reviewno sensitive capabilityproxy_traceno sensitive capabilityrecord_field_aliasno sensitive capabilityrecord_navigation_pathno sensitive capabilityrecord_resultno sensitive capabilityrepair_wdano sensitive capabilityreport_server_statusno sensitive capabilityrestore_retained_proxyno sensitive capabilityreview_sessionno sensitive capabilityrule_previewno sensitive capabilityrun_casesno sensitive capabilityrun_diagnosisno sensitive capabilityrun_visual_comparisonno sensitive capabilityruntime_statusno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilitysmart_clickno sensitive capabilitystart_runno sensitive capabilitystop_report_serverno sensitive capabilitysuggest_field_aliasno sensitive capabilitysuggest_navigation_pathno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilityworkflow_contractno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v0.3.0 |
A 92/100 | 12 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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