Autodev X MCP Server
autodev-x
PyPI
v0.1.0a6
Published by merchloubna70-dot — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI-driven software factory: CrewAI + Codex CLI + Claude Code CLI with multi-CLI router, A2A roundtable, MCP server, scale-adaptive delivery from brief to release-ready project.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/autodev/mcp_server/path_safety.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/mcp_server/path_safety.py:31`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / *.pem globs) "id_rsa", "id_dsa", "id_ecdsa", "id_ed25519", "id_xmss",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/mcp_server/path_safety.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/adapters/a2a/transports/local_shell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/adapters/a2a/transports/local_shell.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( argv, env=os.environ.copy(), cap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/adapters/a2a/transports/local_shell.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/adapters/mcp_client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/adapters/mcp_client.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._proc = subprocess.Popen( argv, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/adapters/mcp_client.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/adapters/opus_adapter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/adapters/opus_adapter.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( argv, env=os.environ.copy(), cap
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/adapters/opus_adapter.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/agents/adversarial_reviewer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/agents/adversarial_reviewer.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: KER), ("subprocess.*shell=True", True, "injection", "subprocess shell=True — command injection", Severity.BLOCK
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/agents/adversarial_reviewer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/agents/document_project.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/agents/document_project.py:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", *args], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/agents/document_project.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/agents/investigator.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/agents/investigator.py:234`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( ["gh", "issue", "view", ticket_id, "--json", "title,body,state,l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/agents/investigator.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/context_providers/search_provider.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/context_providers/search_provider.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["rg", "--no-heading", "--line-number", "-i", "-m", "1",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/context_providers/search_provider.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/coverage_gate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/coverage_gate.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: exec") try: exec(code, ns) except SystemExit: raise if __name__ == "__main__": main()
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/coverage_gate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/executors/_fs_observer.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/executors/_fs_observer.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: l: try: r = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--is-inside-work-tree"], cwd=path,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/executors/_fs_observer.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/autodev/executors/claude_code_executor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/autodev/executors/claude_code_executor.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rue) proc = subprocess.run( argv, cwd=request.repo_path, env
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/autodev/executors/claude_code_executor.py
low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_parallel_review_5sections.py)MTC-SRC-003
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_parallel_review_5sections.py:49`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: jection\n" " requests.get('http://example.com', timeout=None) # network flake\n" " now = datetime
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_parallel_review_5sections.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/integration/test_mcp_path_secret_denial.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/integration/test_mcp_path_secret_denial.py:88`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e_path("/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa.key") def test_rejects_secret_substring_in_basename(self): """my-secret-file
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/integration/test_mcp_path_secret_denial.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/unit/test_adversarial_reviewer.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/unit/test_adversarial_reviewer.py:104`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d injection finding for eval()" assert injection[0].severity_finding is not None # -------------------------------
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/unit/test_adversarial_reviewer.py
Tools 9
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
autodev_classify_inputno sensitive capabilityautodev_create_prdno sensitive capabilityautodev_deliver_projectno sensitive capabilityautodev_list_runsno sensitive capabilityautodev_release_checkno sensitive capabilityautodev_reportno sensitive capabilityautodev_roundtableno sensitive capabilityautodev_run_issueno sensitive capabilityautodev_scanno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (9 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0a6 latest |
A 93/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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