Baton (augmnt-sh) MCP Server
@augmnt-sh/baton
npm
v0.1.7
Published by @augmnt-sh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/cli/index.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process'); // Resolve absolute path to mcp-server.js using import.meta.url
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/index.ts:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import('child_process') // Resolve absolute path to mcp-server.js using import.meta.url //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.ts
Tools 120
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tempo_getAllowancereads sensitive datatempo_getTokenRolesreads sensitive datatempo_applySlippageno sensitive capabilitytempo_approveno sensitive capabilitytempo_authorizeAccessKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_authorizeFullAccessKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_authorizeTransferOnlyKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_batchTransferno sensitive capabilitytempo_burnno sensitive capabilitytempo_burnFeeLiquidityno sensitive capability
Show 110 more tools ↓
tempo_calculateSwapWithSlippageno sensitive capabilitytempo_cancelOrderno sensitive capabilitytempo_canITransferno sensitive capabilitytempo_canTransferno sensitive capabilitytempo_checksumAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_claimRewardsno sensitive capabilitytempo_claimRewardsMultino sensitive capabilitytempo_createPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_createTimeLockPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_createTransferLimitPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_deriveAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_deriveFromMnemonicno sensitive capabilitytempo_distributeRewardno sensitive capabilitytempo_doIHaveClaimableRewardsno sensitive capabilitytempo_encodeFunctionDatano sensitive capabilitytempo_encodeMemono sensitive capabilitytempo_estimateContractGasno sensitive capabilitytempo_estimateFeeno sensitive capabilitytempo_formatAmountno sensitive capabilitytempo_fundAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_fundMeno sensitive capabilitytempo_generateWalletno sensitive capabilitytempo_getAccessKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_getAccessKeysno sensitive capabilitytempo_getAccessKeysWithInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getAccountInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getAllFeeTokensInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getBalanceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getBalancesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getBlockno sensitive capabilitytempo_getBlockNumberno sensitive capabilitytempo_getChainInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getClaimableRewardsno sensitive capabilitytempo_getClaimableRewardsMultino sensitive capabilitytempo_getContractAddressesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getContractCodeno sensitive capabilitytempo_getFeeLiquidityno sensitive capabilitytempo_getFeeRateno sensitive capabilitytempo_getFeeTokenno sensitive capabilitytempo_getFeeTokenInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getGasPriceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getIncomingTransfersno sensitive capabilitytempo_getKnownTokensno sensitive capabilitytempo_getLiquidityShareno sensitive capabilitytempo_getLogsno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAccessKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAccessKeysno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAccessKeysWithInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAccountInfono sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyAllowanceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyBalanceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyBalancesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyClaimableRewardsno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyClaimableRewardsMultino sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyFeeLiquidityno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyFeeTokenno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyIncomingTransfersno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyLiquidityShareno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyNonceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyNonZeroBalancesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyOutgoingTransfersno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyTokenRolesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getMyTransferHistoryno sensitive capabilitytempo_getNonceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getNonZeroBalancesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getOrderno sensitive capabilitytempo_getOutgoingTransfersno sensitive capabilitytempo_getPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_getPriceno sensitive capabilitytempo_getStorageAtno sensitive capabilitytempo_getSupportedFeeTokensno sensitive capabilitytempo_getSwapQuoteno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTickno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTokenBalancesno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTokenMetadatano sensitive capabilitytempo_getTotalFeeLiquidityno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTransactionno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTransferHistoryno sensitive capabilitytempo_getTransferPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_getUserFeeTokenno sensitive capabilitytempo_grantRoleno sensitive capabilitytempo_hasClaimableRewardsno sensitive capabilitytempo_hasPermissionno sensitive capabilitytempo_hasTransferPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_isContractno sensitive capabilitytempo_isSupportedFeeTokenno sensitive capabilitytempo_mintno sensitive capabilitytempo_mintFeeLiquidityno sensitive capabilitytempo_parseAmountno sensitive capabilitytempo_placeFlipno sensitive capabilitytempo_placeOrderno sensitive capabilitytempo_priceToTickno sensitive capabilitytempo_readContractno sensitive capabilitytempo_removeTransferPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_revokeAccessKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_revokeRoleno sensitive capabilitytempo_setFeeTokenno sensitive capabilitytempo_setRewardRecipientno sensitive capabilitytempo_setTransferPolicyno sensitive capabilitytempo_simulateContractno sensitive capabilitytempo_swapno sensitive capabilitytempo_tickToPriceno sensitive capabilitytempo_transferno sensitive capabilitytempo_truncateAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_validateAddressno sensitive capabilitytempo_validateMnemonicno sensitive capabilitytempo_validatePrivateKeyno sensitive capabilitytempo_withdrawOrderno sensitive capabilitytempo_writeContractno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (120 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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