Audrey MCP Server
audrey
npm
v1.3.0
Source verified
Published by evilander — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Automatic, evidence-backed memory and pre-action Guard for Codex, Claude Code, and custom AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-server/codex-hooks-probe.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server/codex-hooks-probe.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { createInterface } from 'node:readline'; import { fileURLToPath } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server/codex-hooks-probe.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-server/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server/index.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import { parseCodexHooksListResponse }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/embedding.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/embedding.js:53`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/embeddings', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/embedding.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/llm.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/llm.js:85`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages', { method: 'POST',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/llm.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/mcp-server/index.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server/index.js:2370`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: await audrey.import(snapshot); return toolResult({ imported: true, stats: audrey.introspect() });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server/index.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/src/audrey.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/audrey.js:982`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: is.db); } async import(snapshot) { return importMemories(this.db, this.embeddingProvider, snapshot);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/audrey.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/src/routes.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/routes.js:578`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: await audrey.import(body.snapshot); return c.json({ imported: true }); } catch (e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/routes.js
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
memory_capsuleno sensitive capabilitymemory_consolidateno sensitive capabilitymemory_decayno sensitive capabilitymemory_dreamno sensitive capabilitymemory_encodeno sensitive capabilitymemory_exportno sensitive capabilitymemory_forgetno sensitive capabilitymemory_greetingno sensitive capabilitymemory_groundno sensitive capabilitymemory_guard_afterno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
memory_guard_beforeno sensitive capabilitymemory_importno sensitive capabilitymemory_introspectno sensitive capabilitymemory_observe_toolno sensitive capabilitymemory_preflightno sensitive capabilitymemory_promoteno sensitive capabilitymemory_recallno sensitive capabilitymemory_recent_failuresno sensitive capabilitymemory_reflectno sensitive capabilitymemory_reflexesno sensitive capabilitymemory_resolve_truthno sensitive capabilitymemory_statusno sensitive capabilitymemory_validateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.2.2 |
A 94/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.1.3 |
A 94/100 | 18 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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