Audio Analysis MCP Server
audio-analysis-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (scratch/explore_signalflow_audio_backend.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scratch/explore_signalflow_audio_backend.py:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) return res.stdout + (res
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scratch/explore_signalflow_audio_backend.py
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/eval_tone_generation.py)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/eval_tone_generation.py:9`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ration.py`'s final test eval (per-param metrics + 4x4 confusion + round-trip mel cosine + schema validation). """ from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/eval_tone_generation.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/generate_subtractive_dataset.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/generate_subtractive_dataset.py:34`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.check_output( ["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=Path(__file__).resolve().
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/generate_subtractive_dataset.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_packaging_metadata.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_packaging_metadata.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ktemp("wheelbuild") subprocess.run( ["uv", "build", "--wheel", "--out-dir", str(out)], cwd=PROJECT_R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_packaging_metadata.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tone_generation_dataset.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tone_generation_dataset.py:87`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e_dataset.py" res = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(script), "--n-samples", "5", "--seed", "0"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_tone_generation_dataset.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_tone_generation_smoke.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_tone_generation_smoke.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: # Tiny dataset. subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, str(GEN_SCRIPT), "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_tone_generation_smoke.py
Tools 11
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
amplitude_analyzeno sensitive capabilityaudio_compareno sensitive capabilityaudio_list_devicesno sensitive capabilityaudio_renderno sensitive capabilityimport_audiono sensitive capabilitynote_isolateno sensitive capabilitynote_transcribeno sensitive capabilitynote_triageno sensitive capabilityspectrum_analyzeno sensitive capabilitystem_separateno sensitive capability
Show 1 more tool ↓
structure_analyzeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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