Ats — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ats-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ats-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "ats-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 88,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.66,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ats-client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ats-client.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ats-client.js"
},
"evidence": "aseUrl; } async exec(command, timeoutSeconds = 30) { const resp = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/cmd`, {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ats-client.js",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/ats-launcher.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/ats-launcher.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/ats-launcher.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createServer } from \"node:net\"; import * as fs from \"node:fs\"; import *",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/ats-launcher.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/actions.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/actions.js:7`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/actions.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await ats.exec(`click -> ${args.element}`, 30); return formatResult(res); } export const hoverSchema =",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/actions.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/capture.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/capture.js:24`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/capture.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await ats.exec(`find -> ${args.selector}`, 30); return formatResult(res); } // ── Browser introspectio",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/capture.js",
"line": 24,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/channels.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/channels.js:10`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/channels.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await ats.exec(`channel-start -> ${args.name} -> ${args.target}`, 120); return formatResult(res); } ex",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/channels.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/window.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/window.js:11`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/window.js"
},
"evidence": "const res = await ats.exec(`scripting -> ${code}`, 30); return formatResult(res); } export const windowResizeSchem",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/window.js",
"line": 11,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "start_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switch_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_keys",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "goto_url",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate_back",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "navigate_forward",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "capture_tree",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "find_elements",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "console_logs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_detail",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "network_cookies",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "hover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "select_option",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "press_key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "file_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "evaluate_js",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "window_resize",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "window_switch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "window_new_tab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "window_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handle_dialog",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_ats_block",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "c91382eaef66c1ca8898658b1c65c53975dadab1ab4f3c169f757d03c67da741",
"stats": {
"tools": 30,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 4,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}