Atlasmemory — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "atlasmemory",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "atlasmemory"
},
"server": {
"name": "atlasmemory"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/atlasmemory.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/atlasmemory.js:457`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/atlasmemory.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from \"child_process\"; var DiffEnricher; var init_diff_enricher = __esm({ \"packages/intelligence/src/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/atlasmemory.js",
"line": 457,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/atlasmemory.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/atlasmemory.js:473`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/atlasmemory.js"
},
"evidence": "}); output = execSync(`git diff --name-status ${ref}`, { encoding: \"utf-8\", timeout:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/atlasmemory.js",
"line": 473,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/atlasmemory.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/atlasmemory.js:2540`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/atlasmemory.js"
},
"evidence": "tring) @import_source) @import (interface_declaration) @interface (type_alias_declaration) @type (call_expressio",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/atlasmemory.js",
"line": 2540,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "search_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_repo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_allowed_evidence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "validate_file_card",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upsert_file_card",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_cards_for_changed_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "build_task_pack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto_refresh",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bootpack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deltapack",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prove_claim",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prove_claims",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handshake",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_bootstrap",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_claude_md",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ai_readiness",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_context_contract",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "acknowledge_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "smart_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resolve_project_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "remember",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "session_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "enrich_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "log_decision",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "bfee1908143c2f6a8e016d1ab6920324c6f88f993f71fb049e8b26b1d4b7e0fa",
"stats": {
"tools": 31,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}