Atlasent MCP Server
@atlasent/mcp-server
npm
v2.11.0
Source verified
Published by atlasent-systems-inc — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
AtlaSent MCP server — authorize-before-execute for any MCP-compatible AI agent
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "atlasent_create_webhook"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "atlasent_create_webhook" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow atlasent_create_webhook
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([atlasent_create_webhook]) and tools that can send data out ([atlasent_create_webhook, atlasent_delete_webhook]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [atlasent_create_webhook] → sinks [atlasent_create_webhook, atlasent_delete_webhook]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow atlasent_create_webhook → atlasent_delete_webhook
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "atlasent_create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "atlasent_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool atlasent_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
atlasent_create_webhooknetwork egressreads sensitive dataatlasent_delete_webhooknetwork egressatlasent_create_approval_requestno sensitive capabilityatlasent_create_evidence_exportno sensitive capabilityatlasent_create_policyno sensitive capabilityatlasent_create_scim_userno sensitive capabilityatlasent_delete_policyno sensitive capabilityatlasent_delete_scim_userno sensitive capabilityatlasent_evaluateno sensitive capabilityatlasent_evaluate_manyno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
atlasent_evaluate_streamno sensitive capabilityatlasent_get_evidence_exportno sensitive capabilityatlasent_get_policyno sensitive capabilityatlasent_get_scim_userno sensitive capabilityatlasent_get_siem_configno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_audit_eventsno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_evidence_exportsno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_permitsno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_policiesno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_scim_groupsno sensitive capabilityatlasent_list_scim_usersno sensitive capabilityatlasent_patch_scim_userno sensitive capabilityatlasent_permitno sensitive capabilityatlasent_queryno sensitive capabilityatlasent_record_execution_evaluationno sensitive capabilityatlasent_resolve_approval_requestno sensitive capabilityatlasent_revoke_permitno sensitive capabilityatlasent_test_siem_deliveryno sensitive capabilityatlasent_trajectory_verifyno sensitive capabilityatlasent_update_policyno sensitive capabilityatlasent_upsert_siem_configno sensitive capabilityatlasent_verify_permitno sensitive capabilityatlasent_vqp_audit_summaryno sensitive capabilityatlasent_vqp_drift_eventsno sensitive capabilityatlasent_vqp_generateno sensitive capabilityatlasent_vqp_verifyno sensitive capabilitydeploy_serviceno sensitive capabilityevaluateno sensitive capabilityverify_permitno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 2
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.11.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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