Atlas Pipeline MCP Server
atlas-pipeline-mcp
npm
v1.0.28
Published by iamnishant51 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Revolutionary MCP server with 31 AI-powered tools including 6 next-gen tools: Codebase Surgeon, Bug Oracle, Code Whisperer, Tech Debt Quantifier, Semantic Search, Smart Merge Resolver. Works with Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Desktop.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/review.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/review.js:100`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: title: 'Dangerous eval() usage', description: 'eval() can execute arbitrary code and is a security ris
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/review.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/security-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/security-scanner.js:128`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: uest.codeBase.includes('Function(')) { vulnerabilities.push({ id: 'INJ-001',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/security-scanner.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/security.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/security.js:117`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: title: 'Use of eval()', description: 'eval() executes arbitrary code and is a severe security risk.',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/security.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/tools/tech-debt-quantifier.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/tech-debt-quantifier.js:63`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ', description: 'Use of eval()', fixTime: 3 }, { regex: /innerHTML\s*=/g, severity: 'high', description: 'in
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/tech-debt-quantifier.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/bug-oracle.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/bug-oracle.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // ============================================================================
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/bug-oracle.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/smart-merge-resolver.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/smart-merge-resolver.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import * as fs from 'fs/promises'; import * as path from 'path'; // ============
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/smart-merge-resolver.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/bug-oracle.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/bug-oracle.js:119`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: onst commits = parseInt(execSync(`git -C "${projectPath}" rev-list --count HEAD -- "${relativePath}"`, { encoding: 'utf-
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/bug-oracle.js
Tools 31
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
atlas_animation_studiono sensitive capabilityatlas_api_helperno sensitive capabilityatlas_bug_oracleno sensitive capabilityatlas_code_whispererno sensitive capabilityatlas_codebase_surgeonno sensitive capabilityatlas_contextno sensitive capabilityatlas_critiqueno sensitive capabilityatlas_css_wizardno sensitive capabilityatlas_dashboardno sensitive capabilityatlas_debugno sensitive capability
Show 21 more tools ↓
atlas_decomposeno sensitive capabilityatlas_dependenciesno sensitive capabilityatlas_docsno sensitive capabilityatlas_explainno sensitive capabilityatlas_gitno sensitive capabilityatlas_intentno sensitive capabilityatlas_optimizeno sensitive capabilityatlas_performance_doctorno sensitive capabilityatlas_pipelineno sensitive capabilityatlas_profilerno sensitive capabilityatlas_providersno sensitive capabilityatlas_refactorno sensitive capabilityatlas_reviewno sensitive capabilityatlas_securityno sensitive capabilityatlas_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilityatlas_smart_mergeno sensitive capabilityatlas_tech_debt_quantifierno sensitive capabilityatlas_testno sensitive capabilityatlas_thinkno sensitive capabilityatlas_ui_ux_designerno sensitive capabilityatlas_variantsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (31 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.28 latest |
B 87/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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