Claude Code Toolkit MCP Server
@asifkibria/claude-code-toolkit
npm
v2.0.0
Published by @asifkibria — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server and CLI toolkit for maintaining, optimizing, and troubleshooting Claude Code installations
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:629`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = await import("child_process"); const args = process.argv.slice(2).filter(a => a !== "--daemon").concat
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/dashboard.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/dashboard.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { generateDashboardHTML } from "./dashboard-ui.js"; import { analyzeClaud
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/dashboard.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/git.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import { listSessions } from "./session-recovery.js"; const CLAUDE_DIR = path.jo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/mcp-validator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/mcp-validator.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: FileSync, spawn } from "child_process"; const CLAUDE_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".claude"); function commandExists(co
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/mcp-validator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/utils.js:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } = require("child_process"); const platform = process.platform; if (platform === "darwin") {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/utils.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/git.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/git.test.js:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require("child_process"); const repoDir = path.join(TEST_DIR, "my-repo"); fs.mkdi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/__tests__/git.test.js
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
archive_conversationsno sensitive capabilityaudit_sessionno sensitive capabilitycheck_alertsno sensitive capabilitycheck_quotasno sensitive capabilityclean_claude_directoryno sensitive capabilityclean_tracesno sensitive capabilitycleanup_backupsno sensitive capabilityenforce_retentionno sensitive capabilityestimate_context_sizeno sensitive capabilityestimate_costno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
export_conversationno sensitive capabilityfind_duplicatesno sensitive capabilityfix_image_issuesno sensitive capabilitygenerate_trace_guardno sensitive capabilityget_conversation_statsno sensitive capabilitygit_integrationno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilityinventory_tracesno sensitive capabilitylist_backupsno sensitive capabilitylist_hooksno sensitive capabilitylist_profilesno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitymcp_performanceno sensitive capabilityrecover_sessionno sensitive capabilityrestore_backupno sensitive capabilityrun_doctorno sensitive capabilityrun_maintenanceno sensitive capabilitysave_profileno sensitive capabilityscaffold_hookno sensitive capabilityscan_image_issuesno sensitive capabilityscan_piino sensitive capabilitysearch_conversationsno sensitive capabilitysecurity_scanno sensitive capabilitystart_dashboardno sensitive capabilityswitch_profileno sensitive capabilityunstick_sessionno sensitive capabilityusage_analyticsno sensitive capabilityusage_reportno sensitive capabilityvalidate_mcp_configno sensitive capabilitywipe_tracesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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