Jenkins (ashwinighuge) MCP Server
@ashwinighuge/jenkins-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.7
Published by @ashwinighuge — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP server for interacting with a Jenkins CI/CD server. Allows you to trigger jobs, check build statuses, and manage your Jenkins instance through MCP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 11 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/jenkins-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/jenkins-mcp.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); // Path to the Python
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/jenkins-mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/jenkins-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/jenkins-mcp.js:16`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const version = execSync(`${cmd} --version 2>&1`, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(); // Check if it's Py
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/jenkins-mcp.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/check-python.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/check-python.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); console.log('🔍 Jenkins MCP Server - Post-install va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/check-python.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@ashwinighuge/jenkins-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/check-python.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @ashwinighuge/jenkins-mcp-server
Tools 14
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_build_artifactingests untrusted inputbatch_cancel_jobsno sensitive capabilitybatch_monitor_jobsno sensitive capabilitybatch_trigger_jobsno sensitive capabilityclear_cacheno sensitive capabilityget_cache_statisticsno sensitive capabilityget_console_logno sensitive capabilityget_folder_infono sensitive capabilitysearch_and_triggerno sensitive capabilitysearch_build_artifactsno sensitive capability
Show 4 more tools ↓
search_jobsno sensitive capabilitysummarize_build_logno sensitive capabilitytrigger_jobno sensitive capabilitywarm_cacheno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.7 latest |
B 82/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @ashwinighuge/jenkins-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Jenkins 12
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 13 side by side →
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