Container MCP Server
@arxndev/container-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by @arxndev — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Apple container — manage Linux containers on macOS via AI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_in_container]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_logs] → sinks [exec_in_container]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_logs → exec_in_container
high Tool "exec_in_container" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_in_container" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_in_container
low Mutating tool "exec_in_container" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_in_container" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_in_container
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_in_containerruns code / shellget_logsreads sensitive databuild_imageno sensitive capabilitycontainer_commitno sensitive capabilitycopy_from_containerno sensitive capabilitycopy_to_containerno sensitive capabilitycreate_networkno sensitive capabilitycreate_volumeno sensitive capabilitydelete_containerno sensitive capabilitydelete_networkno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
delete_volumeno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_containerno sensitive capabilityexplain_containerno sensitive capabilityget_container_processesno sensitive capabilityget_container_statsno sensitive capabilityinspect_containerno sensitive capabilityinspect_imageno sensitive capabilitylist_containersno sensitive capabilitylist_imagesno sensitive capabilitylist_networksno sensitive capabilitylist_volumesno sensitive capabilitypause_containerno sensitive capabilitypull_imageno sensitive capabilitypush_imageno sensitive capabilityremove_imageno sensitive capabilityrename_containerno sensitive capabilityrun_containerno sensitive capabilitystart_containerno sensitive capabilitystop_containerno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitysystem_pruneno sensitive capabilitytag_imageno sensitive capabilityunpause_containerno sensitive capabilitywait_containerno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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