Article (gqy20) MCP Server
article-mcp
PyPI
v0.2.2
Published by gqy20 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Article MCP文献搜索服务器 - 基于Europe PMC、arXiv等多个数据源的学术文献搜索工具
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py:174`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 列化参数 query_params = eval(params) if params else None return api_client.get(url, query_params) def make_api_re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py:174`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 列化参数 query_params = eval(params) if params else None return api_client.get(url, query_params) def make_api_re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/article_mcp/services/api_utils.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/quick_test.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/quick_test.py:104`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nfo"] result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, env=env, cwd=proje
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quick_test.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/run_all_tests.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/run_all_tests.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 行测试脚本 result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, str(script_path)], capture_output=Tru
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/run_all_tests.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/simulate_cherry_studio.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/simulate_cherry_studio.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 服务器进程 process = subprocess.Popen( [command] + args, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/simulate_cherry_studio.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test_fastmcp_compliance.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test_fastmcp_compliance.py:196`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: process = subprocess.Popen( [ sys.executable, "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test_fastmcp_compliance.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test_pytest_suite.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test_pytest_suite.py:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ime() result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=Path(__fi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test_pytest_suite.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test_working_functions.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test_working_functions.py:123`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nfo"] result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, env=env, cwd=proje
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/test_working_functions.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_complete_http_client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_complete_http_client.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: server_process = subprocess.Popen( [ "python", "-m", "article_mcp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_complete_http_client.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/quick_test.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/quick_test.py:131`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : module = __import__(f"article_mcp.services.{module_name}", fromlist=[class_name]) getattr(mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quick_test.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan article-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Article 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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