Arpeio MCP Server
arpeio-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by arpe-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Tool "fastbcp_execute_export" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "fastbcp_execute_export" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool fastbcp_execute_export
high Tool "fasttransfer_execute_transfer" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "fasttransfer_execute_transfer" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool fasttransfer_execute_transfer
high Tool "lakexpress_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "lakexpress_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool lakexpress_execute_command
high Tool "migratorxpress_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "migratorxpress_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool migratorxpress_execute_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/base/command_builder.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/base/command_builder.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, check=False)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/base/command_builder.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/base/version_detector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/base/version_detector.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y: result = subprocess.run( [self._binary_path, "--version", "--nobanner"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/base/version_detector.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/doc_search/index.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/doc_search/index.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( [binary_path, "--version", "--nobanner"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/doc_search/index.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "fastbcp_execute_export"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "fastbcp_execute_export" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool fastbcp_execute_export · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "fasttransfer_execute_transfer"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "fasttransfer_execute_transfer" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool fasttransfer_execute_transfer · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "lakexpress_execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "lakexpress_execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool lakexpress_execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "migratorxpress_execute_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "migratorxpress_execute_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool migratorxpress_execute_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "fastbcp_execute_export" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fastbcp_execute_export" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fastbcp_execute_export
low Mutating tool "fasttransfer_execute_transfer" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "fasttransfer_execute_transfer" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool fasttransfer_execute_transfer
low Mutating tool "lakexpress_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "lakexpress_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool lakexpress_execute_command
low Mutating tool "migratorxpress_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "migratorxpress_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool migratorxpress_execute_command
Tools 17
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fastbcp_execute_exportruns code / shellfasttransfer_execute_transferruns code / shelllakexpress_execute_commandruns code / shellmigratorxpress_execute_commandruns code / shellarpe_get_statusno sensitive capabilityarpe_quick_startno sensitive capabilityarpe_release_notesno sensitive capabilityfastbcp_infono sensitive capabilityfastbcp_preview_exportno sensitive capabilityfasttransfer_infono sensitive capability
Show 7 more tools ↓
fasttransfer_preview_transferno sensitive capabilitylakexpress_infono sensitive capabilitylakexpress_preview_commandno sensitive capabilitymigratorxpress_infono sensitive capabilitymigratorxpress_preview_commandno sensitive capabilitymigratorxpress_validate_auth_fileno sensitive capabilitysearch_docsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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