Argus Search MCP Server
argus-search
PyPI
v1.6.4
Published by khamel83 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Retrieval platform for AI agents — 14 search providers, 12-step content extraction, dead URL recovery, site capture, and local corpus storage. One API.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Shell/command execution in server code (argus/config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`argus/config.py:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["secrets", "decrypt", name], capture_ou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server argus/config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (argus/extraction/playwright_extractor.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`argus/extraction/playwright_extractor.py:338`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,rss=,comm="], check=False,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server argus/extraction/playwright_extractor.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (argus/recovery/evidence.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`argus/recovery/evidence.py:465`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ailable") process = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", __name__, "--lifecycle-status", path],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server argus/recovery/evidence.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (argus/runtime_manifest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`argus/runtime_manifest.py:345`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: version_result = subprocess.run( [executable, "--version"], capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server argus/runtime_manifest.py
low Hardcoded JSON Web Token in test/example/packaging (tests/test_evidence_bundle.py)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `tests/test_evidence_bundle.py:652`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server tests/test_evidence_bundle.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_delivery_contract.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_delivery_contract.py:26`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: etadata(): result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "scripts/verify_release_contract.py"], cwd=REPO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_delivery_contract.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_distribution_artifacts.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_distribution_artifacts.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _path / "installed" subprocess.run( ["uv", "build", "--wheel", "--out-dir", str(wheel_dir)], cwd=ROO
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_distribution_artifacts.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_transport.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_transport.py:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ules ) ''' result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", script], cwd=os.path.dirname(os.path.dirn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_transport.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_v2.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_v2.py:1325`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) http_process = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, "-c", """ import s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_mcp_v2.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_playwright_lifecycle.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_playwright_lifecycle.py:308`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if any.""" result = subprocess.run( ["ps", "-axo", "pid=,ppid=,command="], check=True, captu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_playwright_lifecycle.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_postgres_provisioning.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_postgres_provisioning.py:81`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: sql or ""]) return subprocess.run( command, check=check, capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_postgres_provisioning.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_architecture_boundaries.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_architecture_boundaries.py:1010`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e = 'argus.extraction'\n__import__(module)\n", ), ) def test_cli_boundary_rejects_direct_aliased_and_dynamic_authori
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_architecture_boundaries.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_extraction_outcomes.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_extraction_outcomes.py:2356`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , ) finalizer = __import__( "argus.extraction.finalizer", fromlist=["ExtractionFinalizer"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_extraction_outcomes.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_provider_readiness.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_provider_readiness.py:1083`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: udget.db'}" first = __import__( "argus.broker.readiness", fromlist=["ProviderReadinessService"] ).Provid
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_provider_readiness.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_providers.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_providers.py:981`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: NG, lambda: __import__( "argus.providers.searxng", fromlist=["SearXNGProvider"]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_providers.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_trafilatura_normalization.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_trafilatura_normalization.py:178`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ractor, ): module = __import__(module_name, fromlist=[entrypoint_name]) entrypoint = getattr(module, entrypoint_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_trafilatura_normalization.py
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
search_healthingests untrusted inputsearch_webingests untrusted inputargus_pathsno sensitive capabilitybuild_research_packno sensitive capabilitycapture_siteno sensitive capabilitycookie_healthno sensitive capabilityexpand_linksno sensitive capabilityextract_contentno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_statusno sensitive capabilityread_pack_fileno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
read_workflow_artifactno sensitive capabilityrecover_dead_articleno sensitive capabilityrecover_urlno sensitive capabilitysearch_budgetsno sensitive capabilitytest_providerno sensitive capabilityvalyu_answerno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 16 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.6.2 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan argus-search --online --registry pypiMore in Web, Search & Scraping
Agent IP: MCP server with patents search tools
MCP server for searching the Agent Almanac — the public catalog of 9,000+ Model Context Protocol servers. Find, install, and discover MCP servers from inside Claude Desktop, Cursor, Continue, Zed, or any MCP-aware agent.
Search agents & MCP servers by capability, with daily-observed pricing, liveness and market data.
Verified merchants accepting agentic payments on Lightning/L402/BOLT12/USDT — search, verify, pay.
Airframe MCP Client - Connect agents to Airframe's product intelligence
Amazon product search demand over time, with growth for any keyword. Free key at trendsmcp.ai