Argrelay — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "argrelay",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "argrelay"
},
"server": {
"name": "argrelay"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 60,
"threatScore": 71,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 23.1,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 7.7
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (none) — trust in the source of the package",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.5"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py:146`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py",
"line": 146
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py:60`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py:146`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigBase.py",
"line": 146
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py",
"line": 60
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/client_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/client_utils.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/client_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "os.system(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/client_utils.py",
"line": 12
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_app_server/mongo_data/MongoServerWrapper.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_app_server/mongo_data/MongoServerWrapper.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_app_server/mongo_data/MongoServerWrapper.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_app_server/mongo_data/MongoServerWrapper.py",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvClientLinkedCommands.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvClientLinkedCommands.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvClientLinkedCommands.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvClientLinkedCommands.py",
"line": 37
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvReadline.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvReadline.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvReadline.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_check_env_plugin_core/PluginCheckEnvReadline.py",
"line": 63
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py:65`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorConfigOnly.py",
"line": 65
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/DelegatorGitRepoGotoRepo.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/DelegatorGitRepoGotoRepo.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/DelegatorGitRepoGotoRepo.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/DelegatorGitRepoGotoRepo.py",
"line": 97
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/git_utils.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/git_utils.py:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/git_utils.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_git/git_utils.py",
"line": 17
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_ssh/DelegatorSshDst.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_ssh/DelegatorSshDst.py:190`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_ssh/DelegatorSshDst.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_demo/demo_ssh/DelegatorSshDst.py",
"line": 190
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/ClientServerTestClass.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/ClientServerTestClass.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/ClientServerTestClass.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/ClientServerTestClass.py",
"line": 46
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/End2EndTestClass.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/End2EndTestClass.py:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/End2EndTestClass.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/argrelay_test_infra/test_infra/End2EndTestClass.py",
"line": 63
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/ClientCommandFactoryAbstract.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/ClientCommandFactoryAbstract.py:34`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/ClientCommandFactoryAbstract.py"
},
"evidence": "import (\n ClientResponseHandlerProposeArgValues\n )",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/argrelay_app_client/relay_client/ClientCommandFactoryAbstract.py",
"line": 34
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorDataBackendGet.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorDataBackendGet.py:22`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorDataBackendGet.py"
},
"evidence": "import (\n instance_data_\n)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_server_plugin_core/plugin_delegator/DelegatorDataBackendGet.py",
"line": 22
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (src/argrelay_lib_root/misc_helper_common/TypeDesc.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/argrelay_lib_root/misc_helper_common/TypeDesc.py:54`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/argrelay_lib_root/misc_helper_common/TypeDesc.py"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "src/argrelay_lib_root/misc_helper_common/TypeDesc.py",
"line": 54
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"argrelay\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "argrelay"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "6099f1e248992a8df9545748234d0b08e2d346d81a4703003cd158566b653e9c",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 14,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 1
}
}
}