Arelle MCP Server
arelle-mcp
PyPI
v2.1.1
Published by thekinghippopotamus — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The definitive MCP server for XBRL processing, validation, and financial analysis — powered by Arelle
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_stdout_is_clean.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_stdout_is_clean.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess[bytes]: return subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", LOAD_SCRIPT, str(path)], capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_stdout_is_clean.py
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
xbrl_browse_taxonomyingests untrusted inputxbrl_edgar_bulk_factsingests untrusted inputxbrl_fetch_sec_filingingests untrusted inputxbrl_anomaly_detectionno sensitive capabilityxbrl_calculation_treeno sensitive capabilityxbrl_check_calculationsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_close_filingno sensitive capabilityxbrl_company_factsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_compare_filingsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_concept_detailsno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
xbrl_create_instanceno sensitive capabilityxbrl_dimension_structureno sensitive capabilityxbrl_dts_comparisonno sensitive capabilityxbrl_edgar_company_infono sensitive capabilityxbrl_edgar_filing_indexno sensitive capabilityxbrl_edgar_insider_tradesno sensitive capabilityxbrl_edgar_searchno sensitive capabilityxbrl_export_conceptsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_export_csvno sensitive capabilityxbrl_export_dtsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_export_jsonno sensitive capabilityxbrl_extract_factsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_extract_textno sensitive capabilityxbrl_fact_detailsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_filing_summaryno sensitive capabilityxbrl_financial_ratiosno sensitive capabilityxbrl_get_cover_pageno sensitive capabilityxbrl_get_exhibitsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_get_footnotesno sensitive capabilityxbrl_get_html_tablesno sensitive capabilityxbrl_get_raw_xmlno sensitive capabilityxbrl_list_filingsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_list_formulasno sensitive capabilityxbrl_list_sectionsno sensitive capabilityxbrl_load_filingno sensitive capabilityxbrl_peer_comparisonno sensitive capabilityxbrl_presentation_treeno sensitive capabilityxbrl_render_statementno sensitive capabilityxbrl_run_formulano sensitive capabilityxbrl_search_sec_conceptno sensitive capabilityxbrl_search_textno sensitive capabilityxbrl_segment_breakdownno sensitive capabilityxbrl_smart_summaryno sensitive capabilityxbrl_trend_analysisno sensitive capabilityxbrl_validateno sensitive capabilityxbrl_validate_extendedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.1.0 |
A 96/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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