Blog Post MCP Server
@archy-ai/blog-post-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Published by @archy-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for AI-powered blog & page publishing on Archy. Works with Claude, ChatGPT, VS Code Copilot, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.mjs:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { readFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; import { promisify } from "no
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.mjs
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
archy_blog_get_postingests untrusted inputarchy_pages_getingests untrusted inputarchy_blog_ai_draftno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_imageno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_image_editno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_media_jobsno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_media_jobs_mark_seenno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_media_metadatano sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_rewriteno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_videono sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
archy_blog_ai_video_finalizeno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_video_jobsno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_video_prompt_suggestno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_ai_video_statusno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_append_blocksno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_assets_completeno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_assets_upload_urlno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_attach_feature_imageno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_attach_feature_videono sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_compose_docno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_create_draftno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_list_postsno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_publishno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_set_body_from_blocksno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_settings_ai_media_getno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_settings_ai_media_updateno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_templatesno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_unpublishno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_update_postno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_upload_local_assetno sensitive capabilityarchy_blog_whoamino sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_ai_outlineno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_ai_sectionno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_createno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_deleteno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_listno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_publishno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_unpublishno sensitive capabilityarchy_pages_updateno sensitive capabilityarchy_workspace_summaryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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