Arc MCP Server
arc-mcp
npm
v0.1.15
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
`plan_exact_design_extraction` 과 `extract_exact_design_document` 는 `@arc/design` exact-first pipeline 을 `arc-mcp`에서 바로 쓰기 위한 도구입니다.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/db.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/db.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/db.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import { setTim
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/db.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/db.js:160`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const author = execSync(`git log -1 --format=%an ${ref}`, { cwd: gitRoot, encoding: "utf8",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/db.js
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
read_project_docsingests untrusted inputadd_test_caseno sensitive capabilityannotate_evidenceno sensitive capabilitycapture_page_to_figmano sensitive capabilitycheck_penpot_token_backendno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_evidenceno sensitive capabilitydelete_project_docs_sectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_test_caseno sensitive capabilityexplain_delivery_latencyno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
extract_exact_design_documentno sensitive capabilitygenerate_executive_updateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_release_briefno sensitive capabilitygenerate_risk_briefno sensitive capabilitygenerate_weekly_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_stateno sensitive capabilityget_work_itemno sensitive capabilityingest_evidenceno sensitive capabilitylink_evidence_to_work_itemno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_qa_pendingno sensitive capabilitylist_qa_rejectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_unlinked_evidencesno sensitive capabilitylist_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitymark_test_caseno sensitive capabilityplan_exact_design_extractionno sensitive capabilityproject_work_itemno sensitive capabilityregister_notion_dbno sensitive capabilityreset_qano sensitive capabilityscan_workspaceno sensitive capabilityupdate_evidenceno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_docsno sensitive capabilityupdate_projection_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_workspace_contextno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.15 latest |
B 82/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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