arbitrum-mcp-tools
npm
v2.0.4
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/stylus/index.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { handleError } from "../common.js"; import * as fs from "fs"; // Helper
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/stylus/index.js
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/contractInteraction/index.js:141`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nst abiResponse = yield fetch(`https://api.arbiscan.io/api?module=contract&action=getabi&address=${contractAddress}&apik
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/contractInteraction/index.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
getTransactionLogsingests untrusted inputactivateStylusContractno sensitive capabilitycacheStylusContractno sensitive capabilitycheckStylusContractno sensitive capabilitycreateStylusProjectno sensitive capabilitydecodeTransactionCalldatano sensitive capabilitydeployMultipleStylusContractsno sensitive capabilitydeployStylusContractno sensitive capabilityestimateGasno sensitive capabilityexportStylusAbino sensitive capabilitygenerateStylusBindingsno sensitive capabilitygetAccountBalanceno sensitive capabilitygetAccountProtocolsno sensitive capabilitygetBatchBalancesno sensitive capabilitygetBlockno sensitive capabilitygetBlockNumberno sensitive capabilitygetContractCodeno sensitive capabilitygetContractEventsno sensitive capabilitygetGasParametersno sensitive capabilitygetGasPriceno sensitive capabilitygetNftMetadatano sensitive capabilitygetNftsno sensitive capabilitygetTokenAllowanceno sensitive capabilitygetTokenBalancesno sensitive capabilitygetTransactionno sensitive capabilitygetTransactionHistoryno sensitive capabilitygetTransactionReceiptno sensitive capabilityinitStylusProjectno sensitive capabilitymultiAddressAnalysisno sensitive capabilityprepareStylusCgenno sensitive capabilityreplayStylusTransactionno sensitive capabilitysimulateTransactionno sensitive capabilitytraceStylusTransactionno sensitive capabilityverifyStylusContractno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.4 latest |
A 92/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan arbitrum-mcp-tools --online
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