Ararahq — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "ararahq-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ararahq-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "ararahq-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 87,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (build/lib/deviceFlow.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`build/lib/deviceFlow.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "build/lib/deviceFlow.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { extractError } from \"./api.js\"; import { ARARA_BASE, OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, O",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "build/lib/deviceFlow.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-SCHEMA-1",
"title": "Description names a credential store the tool cannot reach",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"logout\" describes a credential store (SSH keys, cloud credentials, a keychain or an equivalent) that nothing in its input schema can address. A tool's interface is the honest statement of what it touches; prose that reaches past it is addressed to the model, not to a reader.",
"remediation": "Remove the reference, or expose the target as an explicit, validated parameter so the client can see and consent to what the tool reads.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "logout",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "keychain",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "login",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "logout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "whoami",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_campaigns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_campaign",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "save_contacts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "opt_out",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_whatsapp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "send_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "broadcast",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "broadcast_ab",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_smart_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_smart_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_short_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_short_links",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_template_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "0d0c735622efa916d8a40deef37f11626d7ee011ed22c3998de5c67e6b23a1a7",
"stats": {
"tools": 19,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}