Docs MCP Server
@arabold/docs-mcp-server
npm
v3.1.0
Published by @arabold — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for fetching and searching documentation
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/main-BDg2etpq.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/main-BDg2etpq.js:13816`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ".babelrc", ".nvmrc", ".npmrc" ]; /** * GitHubScraperStrategy is a discovery strategy that orchestrates the scraping o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/main-BDg2etpq.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/main-BDg2etpq.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/main-BDg2etpq.js:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { Readable } from "node:stream"; i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/main-BDg2etpq.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils-DCwrdF5w.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils-DCwrdF5w.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { createInterface } from "node:readline"; //#region src/utils/paths.ts va
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils-DCwrdF5w.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ;try{let n=await Br(()=>import(e.module),[]);return t[e.id]=n,n}catch(t){return console.error(`Error loading route modul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (public/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`public/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ;try{let n=await Br(()=>import(e.module),[]);return t[e.id]=n,n}catch(t){return console.error(`Error loading route modul
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server public/assets/index-Jf4IQnpW.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@arabold/docs-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo 'Skipping Playwright browser install. See README.md for details.'
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @arabold/docs-mcp-server
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 7
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.1.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.0.1 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-29 |
v3.0.0 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v2.5.0 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v2.4.5 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Show 2 more versions ↓
v2.4.4 |
A 92/100 | 6 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v2.4.2 |
C 71/100 | 6 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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