Appstore Connect (npm) MCP Server
appstore-connect-mcp-server
npm
v1.1.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for interacting with the App Store Connect API. This server provides tools for managing apps, beta testers, bundle IDs, devices, app metadata, and capabilities in App Store Connect.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/cli/cli_process.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/cli/cli_process.py:97`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: self._process = subprocess.Popen( self._command_args, stdout=stdout,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/cli/cli_process.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/altool/altool.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/altool/altool.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.check_output(["xcrun", "altool", "--version"]) except subprocess.CalledProces
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/altool/altool.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/ipa.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/ipa.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed_process = subprocess.run( command_args, capture_output=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/ipa.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/macos_package.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/macos_package.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: else: subprocess.check_output(command, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) except subprocess.CalledProcess
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/application_package/macos_package.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/bundle_id_detector.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/bundle_id_detector.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: stdout = subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE).decode() except subprocess.CalledPr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/bundle_id_detector.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/certificate_p12_exporter.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/certificate_p12_exporter.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: completed_process = subprocess.run( (self._executable, "pkcs12", "-help"), capture_o
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/certificate_p12_exporter.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_sign_entitlements.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_sign_entitlements.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: output = subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) except subprocess.CalledProcessErro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_sign_entitlements.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_signing_settings_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_signing_settings_manager.py:126`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: else: subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) except subprocess.CalledProcessErro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/code_signing_settings_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/pbx_project.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/pbx_project.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: se: subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) except subprocess.CalledProcess
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/pbx_project.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/provisioning_profile.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/provisioning_profile.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: stdout = subprocess.check_output(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE) converted = cls._bytes(stdo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server cli-tools/src/codemagic/models/provisioning_profile.py
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_analytics_report_segmentingests untrusted inputdownload_finance_reportingests untrusted inputdownload_sales_reportingests untrusted inputlist_analytics_report_segmentsingests untrusted inputadd_tester_to_groupno sensitive capabilitycreate_analytics_report_requestno sensitive capabilitycreate_app_store_versionno sensitive capabilitycreate_bundle_idno sensitive capabilitydisable_bundle_capabilityno sensitive capabilityenable_bundle_capabilityno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
get_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_app_store_version_localizationno sensitive capabilityget_beta_feedback_screenshotno sensitive capabilityget_bundle_id_infono sensitive capabilitylist_analytics_reportsno sensitive capabilitylist_app_store_version_localizationsno sensitive capabilitylist_app_store_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_beta_feedback_screenshotsno sensitive capabilitylist_beta_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_bundle_idsno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_group_testersno sensitive capabilitylist_schemesno sensitive capabilitylist_usersno sensitive capabilityremove_tester_from_groupno sensitive capabilityupdate_app_store_version_localizationno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan appstore-connect-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Appstore Connect 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
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Apple Store Connect MCP Server with OAuth authentication support for Claude Desktop/iOS
MCP server for interacting with App Store Connect
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