Apple Photos MCP Server
apple-photos-mcp
npm
v2.1.12
Source verified
Published by sweetrb — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Apple Photos - query, search, export, and inspect the macOS Photos library via Claude and other AI assistants, plus opt-in album/metadata write tools (read-only by default)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 6 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:2947`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:21682`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/photos_reader.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/photos_reader.py:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: peScript MCP server via child_process. Reads go through osxphotos (direct SQLite parse). The OPT-IN write commands (cre
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/photos_reader.py
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:22136`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: on"]) { try { execSync(`${cmd} --version`, { stdio: "pipe" }); return cmd; } catch { continue;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (preinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"apple-photos-mcp" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const fs=require('fs');const ua=process.env.npm_config_user_agent||'';if(fs.existsSync('.git')&&!ua.startsWith('pnpm')){console.error('\nThis repo uses
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package apple-photos-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 8
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.1.12 latest |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.1.11 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.1.10 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.1.9 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.1.7 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
Show 3 more versions ↓
v2.1.5 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v2.1.4 |
B 87/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
v2.1.3 |
B 85/100 | 2 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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