apple-mail-mcp
npm
v2.17.8
Source verified
Published by sweetrb — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Apple Mail - read, search, send, and manage emails via Claude and other AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:2953`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
In the server's implementation (`build/cli.js:11258`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { spawn } = __require("child_process"); var packageData = require_package(); var shared = require_shared();
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/cli.js
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:18416`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { spawn } = __require("child_process"); var packageData = require_package(); var shared = require_shared();
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
"apple-mail-mcp" executes preinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node -e "const fs=require('fs');const ua=process.env.npm_config_user_agent||'';if(fs.existsSync('.git')&&!ua.startsWith('pnpm')){console.error('\nThis repo uses
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package apple-mail-mcp
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.17.8 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.17.7 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v2.17.3 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.17.2 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v2.17.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.16.1 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v2.16.0 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-19 |
v2.10.33 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.10.31 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v2.10.17 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan apple-mail-mcp --online
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