Appium (npm) MCP Server
appium-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.61
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Claude-compatible MCP server for Appium (Android + iOS)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 12 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/appium-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/appium-mcp-server.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execSync } = require("child_process"); const path = require("path"); const fs = require("fs"); const venvDir = path.j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/appium-mcp-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/appium_controller.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/appium_controller.py:530`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: output = subprocess.check_output(["xcrun", "simctl", "list", "runtimes"], text=True) versions = r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/appium_controller.py
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/appium-mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/appium-mcp-server.js:15`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const result = execSync(`${candidate} --version`, { encoding: "utf8", stdio: "pipe" });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/appium-mcp-server.js
medium Tool "write_files_batch" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_files_batch" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_files_batch
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "write_files_batch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_files_batch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_files_batch
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "write_files_batch"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "write_files_batch" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool write_files_batch · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"appium-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: echo '📦 Installing Python dependencies...' && (python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt || echo '⚠️ Python dependencies not installed. Run manually: pip inst
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package appium-mcp-server
Tools 15
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
appium_get_page_sourceingests untrusted inputwrite_filewrites fileswrite_files_batchwrites filesappium_find_elementno sensitive capabilityappium_get_textno sensitive capabilityappium_handle_ios_alertno sensitive capabilityappium_input_textno sensitive capabilityappium_quit_sessionno sensitive capabilityappium_scrollno sensitive capabilityappium_start_sessionno sensitive capability
Show 5 more tools ↓
appium_take_screenshotno sensitive capabilityappium_tap_elementno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilityextract_selectors_from_page_sourceno sensitive capabilitygrant_ios_permissionsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (15 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.61 latest |
B 81/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan appium-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Appium 2
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